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PLURALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT REVISITED: THE
ROLE OF COMMENT AGENCIES IN NEPA LITIGATION
Michael C. Blumm* & Marla Nelson"
INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)-the "Magna Charta"
of environmental law in the United States' and a model for other countries
from high expectations and misunderstood
worldwide 2-suffers
implementation. The statute disappointed many environmental advocates
when the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly denied that it imposed any
substantive environmental direction on federal agencies.3 Instead, the Court
has held that NEPA's requirements are procedural rather than substantive.4
Thus, courts have interpreted NEPA to require close judicial scrutiny of the
agency procedures implementing the statute.5 These procedures require all
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks to
Aurora Paulsen, J.D. 2012, Lewis and Clark Law School, for editorial assistance.
** Legal Fellow, Northwest Environmental Defense Center; J.D. 2012, Lewis and Clark Law
School; B.A. 2006, St. Olaf College. Thanks to Professor Blumm for refining my writing skills and to
Aurora Paulsen for editorial assistance.
1. See, e.g., Arthur W. Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing
Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 963,988 (1972)

(explaining that NEPA "has received a very broad interpretation from the courts" and "is viewed as a
congressional mandate to agencies to consider environmental goals equally with their traditional
objectives"); see also Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes ofAge: NEPA's Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 113, 118 (2010) (suggesting that the history surrounding. NEPA's passage indicates Congress

intended the Act to be more than simply procedural "when it passed the Magna Carta of environmental
laws"); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2011) (describing NEPA as the "basic national charter for protection of
the environment").
2. See, e.g., William A. Tilleman, Public Participation in the Environmental Impact
Assessment Process:A ComparativeStudy of Impact Assessment in Canada, the UnitedStates, and the
EuropeanCommunity, 33 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 361 (1995) ("It is not without significance or

coincidence that many countries, including Canada and the [European Community], have patterned
environmental impact laws and policies after NEPA.").
3. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) ("NEPA
merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action."); see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) ("NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve
particular substantive environmental results."). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 342 n.40 (2004) (identifying "legalist critic" proponents who assert that
Congress intended for NEPA to impose substantive obligations because statutory provisions such as
sections 101(a) and (b) of NEPA "appear[] to be aimed at substantive improvements in environmental
results").
4. See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350 ("[lIt is now well settled that NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.").
5. See, e.g., id. ("The sweeping policy goals... of NEPA are... realized through a set of
'action-forcing' procedures that require that agencies take a 'hard look' at environmental
consequences... ."(quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,409-10)); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983) ("The role of the courts is simply to ensure that
the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions."); Citizens
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federal agencies to study the environmental effects of their proposals,
evaluate alternative courses of action, and accurately disclose those effects
and alternatives to the public.6 NEPA documents have been challenged in
lawsuits, opening the courthouse doors to those alleging that agencies fail to
meet NEPA requirements, and producing a mountain of litigation.
The results of NEPA litigation often appear haphazard. Some observers
have even likened NEPA's effect to a "common law" of the environment that
allows individual judges to second-guess federal agencies' decision making.8
It is in fact quite conceivable that a reviewing court's opinion of the wisdom
of an underlying federal proposal might be reflected in its decision about the
sufficiency of the proposal's environmental documentation. Thus, for
example, a determination that an environmental assessment is inadequate
because the agency failed to give sufficient weight to environmental factors
might reflect a court's assessment of whether the proposal is good policy.9
But the Supreme Court has consistently rejected judicial second-guessing of
the substance of agency proposals: according to the Court, NEPA does not
equip judges with the authority to reverse agency decisions on their merits.' 0
to Protect Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (explaining that a reviewing court must
be "searching and careful" in considering "whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment"); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing "the
responsibility of the courts to reverse" if a "decision was reached procedurally without individualized
consideration and balancing of environmental factors").
6. See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349 (discussing NEPA's procedural requirements). As the
Methow Valley Court explained:

[NEPA] ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and
will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to
the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decision-making process
and the implementation of that decision.
Id.; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97 (noting that publication of an EIS provides
public assurance that the agency "has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decision-making
process").
7. Based on annual surveys of all federal agencies, CEQ statistics show that between 2004
and 2008, an average of 122 new NEPA cases were filed each year, and as many as 251 NEPA cases
were pending in 2004. NEPA Litigation Survey, NEPANET, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/nepanet.htm
(last visited September 11, 2011).
8.

See, e.g., Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learning from NEPA: Guidelines

for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 93, 128 (1999) (explaining that "the
common law of NEPA has created an operative system of experts both within and outside the agency").
9.

See, e.g., Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Strycker's Bay

Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S 223, 227 (1980) (asserting that the Second Circuit
"looked to 'the provisions of NEPA' for 'the substantive standards necessary to review the merits of
agency decisions' and improperly concluded "an agency, in selecting a course of action, must elevate
environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations").
10. See e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 556
(1978) (explaining that NEPA decisions should only be set aside "for substantial procedural or
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NEPA does, however, expressly impose procedural requirements on
federal proposals for considering public and governmental comments on
them. Under the statute, when evaluating the environmental effects of their
proposals, agencies must solicit and consider comments not only from the
public, but also from other agencies-particularly those agencies with
environmental expertise." Far from being insignificant, comments from
other agencies may substantially impact courts' judgments about whether
lead agencies have complied with NEPA. In fact, as one of us claimed in a
study over two decades ago, the supportive or critical nature of comments
from agencies with environmental expertise often predicts the outcome of
NEPA litigation.' 2 That 1990 article concluded that the nature of agency
comments frequently explained why courts did or did not determine that an
agency had violated NEPA.13
In this article, we update that 1990 study, considering NEPA cases in
which courts relied on agency comments to arrive at conclusions about
NEPA compliance. In addition to reviewing court rulings that were
consistent with the opinions of comment agencies, we assess decisions in
which courts mentioned agency comments but arrived at a contrary result to
those comments. Thus, our consideration of several decades of NEPA cases
is revealing. Two decades ago, agency comments explained a high
percentage of the outcomes of NEPA litigation; twenty-some years later,
the correlation between agency comments and case outcomes is somewhat
less obvious.
Our study proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background on NEPA's
requirements for interagency comments, which we refer to as interagency
pluralism, and also explains the results of our earlier study. Part II evaluates
substantive reasons as mandated by statute . . . not simply because the court is unhappy with the result
reached"); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S 223, 227 (1980) ("[O]nce an
agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to
insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences.").
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) ("Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible
Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."). NEPA includes both
federal and state agencies within this directive, and probably should be interpreted to also include tribal
agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a) (instructing lead agencies to "[o]btain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise," as well as request comments from state and
local agencies, Indian tribes, and the public).
12.

Michael C. Blumm & Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of

Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation,14 HARV. ENTL. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990) ("Lead agencies must
confront and usually resolve comments from environmental agencies or run a considerable risk of court
injunction," but "projects that do not engender expert agency opposition are unlikely candidates for
NEPA violations.").
13. Id. ("[Clourts have been sensitive to NEPA's goal of making the views of agencies with
environmental expertise more prominent in federal decisionmaking.").

8

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 37:005

recent cases in which courts employed agency comments to conclude either
that an agency improperly failed to produce environmental impact statements,
or that the statement an agency produced was inadequate. Part m then
discusses courts' consideration of adverse comments from internal lead
agency staff. Part IV assesses cases in which courts held that lead agencies
complied with NEPA's requirements, relying in part on interagency
comments supporting the lead agency's analysis. Both types of cases are
consistent with our thesis that agency comments are often predictive of
compliance with NEPA. Part V examines cases where courts made NEPA
determinations that were inconsistent with agency comments-a practice that
seems to contradict our thesis. Despite the results of these outlier cases, we
conclude that comments from agencies with environmental expertise remain
an important, if underappreciated, predictor of NEPA case law. Further, we
offer some suggestions about what this reiteration should mean for lead
agencies, comment agencies, and NEPA litigants.
I.

NEPA's COMMENT REQUIREMENTS

Seeking to ensure informed decisions, '4NEPA requires a federal agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) on any "major federal
action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.,' 5 This
EIS must discuss the environmental impacts of a proposed action, any
unavoidable adverse environmental effects, any alternatives, the relationship
between short-term uses and long-term productivity, and any irreversible or
irretrievable commitments of resources the proposed action would require.' 6
Under regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ),17 an EIS must be "concise, clear, and to the point," and also "supported
by evidence that agencies have made the necessary environmental analyses."' 8
14. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2011) ("The NEPA process is intended to help public officials
make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that
protect, restore, and enhance the environment.").
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
16. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2011) (requiring an agency to "provide [a] full and fair discussion
of significant environmental impacts" such that it will "inform decision makers and the public of the
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the
human environment").
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-4347 (2006) (establishing CEQ to oversee implementation of
NEPA); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1 (2011) (outlining the purposes of the regulations as "[i]ntegrating
the NEPA process into early planning ... [e]mphasizing cooperative consultation among agencies" to
avoid adversary comments after an analysis is complete, "[p]roviding for the swift and fair resolution"
of dispute, "narrowing the scope of the [EIS]" at an early stage, and "[p]roviding a mechanism for
putting appropriate time limits on the [EIS] process"); id. § 1507.3 (requiring individual agencies to
-"adopt procedures to supplement these regulations").
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(b) (2011).
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An agency may prepare a less detailed environmental assessment (EA)
if it is unclear whether a proposal will require an EIS.'9 An EA aims to
"[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to
prepare an [EIS]." 20 In the Ninth Circuit, an agency must prepare an EIS
instead of an EA if there are substantial questions "as to whether a
project ... may cause significant degradation of some human environmental
factor."21 Other circuits have a higher threshold, requiring an EIS if the
project will significantly affect the environment. To determine whether the
expected effects of an agency's proposal will be significant, CEQ regulations
require agencies to consider the context and intensity of the environmental
impacts. 23 If an EA reveals that a proposed action will not significantly affect
the environment, the agency may issue a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI) in a record of decision (ROD) instead of writing an EIS.24
Consistent with its environmental purpose, 2s NEPA incorporates
commenting opportunities at all stages of the NEPA process and
encourages-and sometimes requires-interagency pluralism. Initially, lead
agencies must consult with other agencies in making the threshold
19. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004).
20. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (2011); see also Rhodes v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir.
1998) (describing an EA as a '"rough-cut, low-budget environmental impact statement designed to show
whether a full-fledged environmental impact statement-which is very costly and time-consuming to
prepare and has been the kiss of death to many a federal project-is necessary"' (quoting Cronin v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990))); River Road Alliance v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S.
Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he purpose of an [EA] is to determine whether there is
enough likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of
preparing an [EIS].").

21. Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.
2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1332), abrogated on
other grounds by Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1176-78 (9th Cir. 2000). See
also Michael C. Blumm & Keith Mossman, The Overlooked Role of NEPA in Protecting the Western
Environment: NEPA in the Ninth Circuit,2 WASH. J. ENVT'L. L AND POL'Y 193 (2012) (describing EIS

preparation and the Ninth Circuit's threshold for requiring an EIS).
22. See, e.g., Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Serv., 380 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 2004); Greater
Yellowstone Coal., 359 F.3d at 1274.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2011).

24. Id. § 1501.4(e); see also id. § 1508.13 (describing a FONSI as including the EA, or a
summary of it, and other related environmental documents).
25. Specifically, NEPA's purpose is:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to the Nation.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006); see also Blumm & Brown, supra
note 12, at 305-06 (discussing NEPA's purpose).

10

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 37:005

determination of whether to prepare an EIS.26 Once a lead agency has
decided to prepare an EIS, it announces its intent through a process called
"scoping." During this process, the agency solicits comments from the
public and other federal, state, and local agencies; the goal of scoping is to
identify issues to study in the EIS.2 Based on the results of the scoping
process, the lead agency prepares a draft EIS,28 which it releases to the
public and other government agencies for comment. 29 At this stage, NEPA
requires the lead agency to consult with commenting agencies. 3 0 In addition
to the lead agency's duty to seek comments, some federal agencies have an
additional duty to provide comments on certain proposed actions. 31 After
evaluating public and governmental comments,32 the lead agency prepares a
final EIS, along with an accompanying ROD.34

26. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (2011) (requiring agencies to "include . . . a listing of agencies and
persons consulted").
27. Id. § 1501.7 (charging a lead agency with the responsibility to "invite the participation of
affected Federal, State, and local agencies" along with "other interested persons"); see also id. § 1503.1
(requiring that after preparation of the draft EIS, but before preparing the final EIS, an agency must
"[o]btain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise" and
"[r]equest the comments" of state and local agencies, Indian tribes, and any agency that has requested
notice).
28. Id. § 1502.9(a).
29. Id. § 1503.1(a).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (2006) ("Prior to making any detailed statement, the [lead agency]
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."); see also 40 C.F.R. 1500.5(b)
(2011) (requiring "interagency cooperation before the environmental impact statement is prepared,
rather than submission of adversary comments on a completed document"); id. § 1502.9(a) ("Draft
[EISs] shall be prepared in accordance with the scope decided upon in the scoping process" and "[tihe
lead agency shall work with the cooperating agencies and shall obtain comments as required in part
1503 . . . ."); id. § 1503.4 (mandating that agencies preparing final EISs "assess and consider comments
both individually and collectively, and shall respond").
31. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.2 (imposing a mandatory duty for agencies with "special expertise" to
comment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2006) (requiring that the EPA "shall review and comment in
writing on the environmental impact of any matter relating to duties and responsibilities granted
pursuant to this chapter or other provisions").
32. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2011) (noting that in final EISs, agencies "shall respond to
comments" and "discuss ... any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the
draft statement and shall indicate the agency's response to the issues raised"). See also id. § 1503.4(a)
(stating that a lead agency "shall assess and consider comments . . . and shall respond by one or more of
the means listed below, stating its response inthe final statement").
33. Id. § 1502.9(b); see also id. § 1502.9(c)(i) (explaining that if the proposed action
substantially changes in a way "relevant to environmental concerns," or if new information comes to
light about environmental impacts, an agency must prepare a supplemental EIS).
34. Id. § 1505.2 (stating that "[a]t the time of its decision" agencies "shall prepare a concise
public record of decision" that states the decision and identifies alternatives and factors considered in
making the decision, and noting "whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental
harm from the alternative selected have been adopted").
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As mentioned above, our 1990 NEPA litigation survey revealed that
courts seriously considered agency comments and consequently evaluated
the lead agency's response to agency comments with heightened judicial
scrutiny.3 s According to that study, these comments resulted in courts
frequently applying greater scrutiny to a lead agency's analysis when the
NEPA challenge raised the concerns discussed in agency comments.3 6
Similarly, the study indicated that where courts upheld an agency's NEPA
analysis, those outcomes often seemed attributable to positive agency
comments. The updated case law in this article reinforces the notion that a
comment agency's support for, or criticism of, a lead agency action is a
good predictor of the outcome of NEPA litigation.
II. ADVERSE AGENCY COMMENTS AND NEPA VIOLATIONS

This Part examines cases in which courts employed agency comments
critical of lead agencies' analyses to conclude that lead agencies violated
NEPA. These recent opinions confirm that agency comments criticizing a
lead agency's actions often draw exacting judicial scrutiny. The cases in
this Part demonstrate that as a result of heightened scrutiny, courts
frequently conclude that an agency's EA or EIS violated NEPA by failing
to address and respond to issues raised in adverse agency comments, or by
failing to sufficiently remedy inadequacies highlighted by adverse
comments.

35. See Blumm & Brown, supra note 12, at 306-07 (concluding that NEPA outcomes were
often closely correlated with the nature of the agency comments).
36. Id. at 292, 296 (explaining that the "threshold cases reveal a decided judicial sensitivity to
the comments of agencies with environmental expertise" and "adverse agency comments on the
adequacy of an EIS seem to function to overcome the otherwise evident judicial presumption in favor of
lead agency findings").
37. Id. at 296-302. Results falling outside of our pluralistic model appeared dependent on the
unique facts of each case. Id. at 302-06 (noting, for example, that in Crounse Corp. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 781 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit may have discounted comments
from the Tennessee Valley Authority based on that agency's "narrow, proprietary interest[s]" that did
not reflect "the perspective of an agency with environmental expertise" and thus did not trigger
heightened judicial scrutiny).
38. Some courts remand to the agency for additional reasoning to support the EA, while other
courts determine the record is sufficient to require the agency to prepare an EIS. Compare San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1024-35 (9th Cir. 2006)
(remanding to the agency because the agency's analysis failed to consider terrorist acts as a factor in its
review of a license application to construct a nuclear spent-fuel storage facility), with Idaho Sporting
Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that "if substantial questions are
raised as to whether a project ... may cause significant degradation of some human environmental
factor," an agency must prepare an EIS (quoting Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1332
(9th Cir. 1992); LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 397 (9th Cir. 1988))).
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Adverse Agency Comments at the Threshold Stage

Litigators have often employed adverse agency comments to
emphasize omissions by lead agencies, encouraging judicial determinations
that agencies improperly failed to produce EISs. According to some courts,
a lead agency's failure to consider recommendations from comment
agencies may signal deficiencies in an EA.39 For example, in Davis v.
Mineta, a 2002 case from the Tenth Circuit, comments from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) highlighted inadequacies in the
Federal Highway Administration's EA. The EA concerned federal funding
of a five-lane highway construction project proposed by the Utah
Department of Transportation and three cities in Utah. 40 The proposed
highway would have bisected a park and tripled noise levels in portions of
that park, and it would have required a new bridge and the demolition or
removal of several historic structures.4 Private individuals opposing the
highway project sought to enjoin its construction, alleging that the agency
prepared an inadequate EA and should have produced an EIS instead. 42 The
district court denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction,
concluding that the agency fulfilled its duty under NEPA when it
determined that the proposed highway expansion would not significantly
increase the rate of development on land east of the Jordan River.43
The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis," focusing on a
comment letter submitted by the EPA, determining that the improved
transportation facilities-in combination with related federal, state, and
private actions-could produce a significant environmental impact.45
39. See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973) ('[W]here comments from
responsible experts or sister agencies disclose new or conflicting data or opinions that cause concern that
the agency may not have fully evaluated the project and its alternatives, these comments may not simply
be ignored."). See also League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that failure to adequately address concerns of a sister agency "weighs as a factor pointing
toward the inadequacy of the EIS").
40. Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002).
41.
42.

Id.at 1112.
Id. at 1109.

43. See id. at 1123 ("The district court accepted the agency's conclusion that the [p]roject
would not significantly increase the rate of growth.").
44. Id. at 1123 n.1 I (rejecting the district court's judicial notice of the rate of development in
the project area because judicial notice "is only appropriate where the issues are 'not subject to
reasonable dispute,"' and there was "a considerable amount of dispute between the parties" concerning
the actual rate of development of the area (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201(b))).
45. Id. at 1123 (noting that EPA "opined that [e]nhanced transportation facilities will generate
or enhance economic activity and development, and that related federal, state, and private actions may
result in significant environmental impact," thus making the agency's FONSI unwarranted (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Although NEPA requires agencies to consider growth-inducing effects of a
proposed action," the Utah Department of Transportation's EA asserted
that the indirect and cumulative impacts of the project would occur
regardless of whether the federal highway was expanded. 47 This analysis
appeared to ignore EPA's concerns,48 even though, as the court explained,
"EPA's viewpoint on this issue [wa]s undeniably relevant."49 The court thus
concluded that the agency's EA was arbitrary and capricious because, inter
alia, it failed to consider whether the area's "relatively unspoiled nature, 5 0
was partly the result of a lack of any major roadway, as suggested by EPA's
comments, and that by failing to address this factor, the district court
abused its discretion.' Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed,
instructing the district court to enter a preliminary injunction precluding
further road construction pending litigation on the merits.s2
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Ocean Advocates
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The court based its decision on the

Corps's failure to address the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's comments
on its EA for a permit under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
authorizing an addition to an oil refinery dock in northeast Puget Sound,
Washington.5 The Fish and Wildlife Service submitted comments on the
proposed permit that raised concerns about the effect of the new dock on
tanker traffic and requested an EIS.54 In response to these comments, the
46. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2011) (defining "effects" to encompass "[indirect effects," which
"may include growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land
use").
47. Davis, 302 F.3d at 1123.
48. See id. See also Plaintiffs Mem. in Opp'n to Dep't of Transp.'s Motion to Strike, Davis v.
Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2002) (No. 2:00-cv-00993), 2007 WL 5355498 (attaching a 2001 letter
from EPA in which EPA maintained that its criticisms of FHWA's EA remained unaddressed).
49. Davis, 302 F.3d at 1123 (noting that "[w]hile it is true that NEPA 'requires agencies
preparing [EISs] to consider and respond to the comments of the other agencies, not to agree with them,'
it is also true that a reviewing court 'may properly be skeptical as to whether an EIS's conclusions have
a substantial basis in fact if the responsible agency has apparently ignored the conflicting views of other
agencies having pertinent expertise."' (quoting Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024,
1038 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983)).
50. Id. at 1123 (explaining that "a map in the record ... confirms ... that the 11400 South
corridor remains in large part an island of open space in a sea of development").
51. Id. at 1123. This failure was in addition to the agency's prejudgment of the NEPA issues,
id at 1112, and inadequate consideration of alternatives. Id. at 1122.
52. Id. at 1126.
53. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 402 F.3d 846, 865-67 (9th Cir. 2004).
54. Id. at 855 (noting that the Fish and Wildlife Service also commented "about the
cumulative impact of the construction and operation of the pier when considered together with
similar ... projects" in the region, and that "[the Fish and Wildlife Service] worried that the additional
platform would facilitate an increase in tanker traffic and product handling, thereby increasing the
likelihood of a major oil spill").
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developer claimed that the dock expansion would actually decrease the risk
of oil spills by reducing the amount of time ships had to anchor at sea while
waiting to dock-a time when ships are most vulnerable to oil spills. 55 The
Corps agreed and issued the permit with an accompanying EA/FONSI,56 as
well as a subsequent one-year permit extension.57 Ocean Advocates
subsequently challenged both the permit issuance and the extension,
claiming, like the Fish and Wildlife Service, that the Corps should have
prepared an EIS on the project rather than an EA/FONSI.ss
The district court upheld the Corps's permit issuance,59 and Ocean
Advocates appealed.6 0 The Ninth Circuit reversed because the Corps failed to
provide sufficient reasons for its FONSI in light of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's concerns that increased tanker traffic would raise the risk of an oil
spill.6 ' Although the Corps's EA recited these concerns, 62 the court decided that
the Corps never addressed the issue of whether there might be increased tanker
traffic, and therefore it was impossible to determine whether the agency
considered this potential impact and the related effects.6 1 The Ninth Circuit
held that since the EA "fail[ed] to provide any reason, let alone a convincing
one, why the Corps refrained from preparing an EIS," the NEPA analysis was
inadequate; accordingly, the court required the Corps to prepare an EIS."
Another case grounded on critical agency comments was Sierra Club v.
Van Antwerp, a 2011 D.C. Circuit decision concluding that an Army Corps
55. Id. at 856.
56. Id. (concluding that "the pier addition 'will not significantly affect the quality of the
human environment,' and that an EIS therefore was not required"). Ocean Advocates asked the Corps to
reopen the permit to consider the project's cumulative impacts, but the Corps declined. Id
57. Id. at 857 (noting that the Corps granted the developer's request in 2000 for a one-year
permit extension to allow time to complete the dock construction, despite concerns from the Washington
State Department of Natural Resources "that circumstances had changed since the Corps originally
granted BP the permit, including the listing of the Puget Sound Chinook salmon and bull trout under the
[ESA]").
58. Id. at 855.
59. Id. at 858 (determining that "NEPA did not require an EIS because the pier extension was
intended to alleviate existing tanker traffic and because tanker traffic would increase with or without the
dock extension").
60. Id. at 854-55.
61. Id. at 865.
62. Id. (stating that "[tihe Corps recounted the concerns that the [Fish and Wildlife Service]
raised, namely increased tanker traffic that would raise the risk of an oil spill").
63. Id. at 866 (explaining that "the Corps never explicitly adopted the claim that the project
could result in an increase in tanker traffic, leaving [the court] to guess whether [the Corps] took a hard
look at, or even considered, this obvious potential impact"). In addition, the court noted that the Corps
"relied wholly on BP's claims that the project would reduce oil spills because of containment booms and
reduced anchoring time." Id.
64. Id. at 865, 875; see also id. at 871 ("Although construction of the dock extension is now
complete, the Corps may impose conditions on [its] operation.").
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of Engineers' EA on a Clean Water Act (CWA) section 404 permit to fill
wetlands in connection with construction of a mall outside of Tampa,
Florida violated NEPA." Environmental groups asserted that the permit and
corresponding EA violated NEPA, the CWA, and the Endangered Species
Act (ESA)." The district court ruled that the Corps failed to comply with
NEPA and the CWA, although it rejected the ESA challenge.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court on the CWA claim and
some of the NEPA and ESA claims 6 8 because the Corps failed to respond to
comments regarding the project's potential effect on the ESA-listed eastern
indigo snake.69 The court determined that the Corps's EA was inadequate
because it failed to address the risk of habitat fragmentation on the snake,
an issue a Fish and Wildlife Service employee raised in a declaration. 70 The
declaration emphasized the importance of the wetlands in question as
corridor habitat for the snake.7 1 Because the Corps failed to address the
effect of habitat fragmentation on the endangered snake, the D.C. Circuit
remanded the case to the Corps.
An agency's failure to consider and address adverse comments from
other agencies may be more than just evidence of a NEPA violation: it may
65.

Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

66. Id. at 1149 (noting there were multiple defendants, including the heads of the Department
of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
67. Id. at 1150.
68. Id. at 1153-55 (rejecting the environmental groups' claims that the proposed project
should be considered significant based on the "unique characteristics of the geographic area" or because
it "threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law or requirements" (quoting 40 C.F.R. §
1508.27(b)(3), (10) (2011)).
69. Id. at 1155, 1157 (stating that "[iun both ESA and NEPA contexts, we . . . find that the
Corps failed to adequately address indications of an adverse effect on the indigo snake" and "we reverse
[the district court] as to NEPA except insofar as the court required further explanation by the Corps as to
potential fragmentation of the indigo snake's habitat"); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(9) (2011)
(requiring agencies to consider adverse effects on "an endangered or threatened species or its habitat" as
an indication of the intensity of a proposed action).
70. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d at 1156-57 (noting that Dr. Kenneth Dodd was "Staff
Herpetologist for the Office of Endangered Species in the [Fish and Wildlife Service] . . . 'primarily
responsible for the listing of the' eastern indigo snake," and that "[g]iven [his] expertise and experience,
and the seeming logic of his analysis ... we think his comment qualifies as the sort of 'relevant and
significant' public comment to which an agency must respond, lest its action be arbitrary and
capricious").
71. Id. at 1156-57 (explaining that Dr. Dodd's comment asserted "the project site was an
important 'wildlife corridor' linking protected areas to the north and south," that "movements over large
areas of fragmented habitats expose Eastern Indigo Snakes to increased road mortality," and that "the
Corps had failed to consider how the project would adversely affect the snake through 'fragmentation'
of its 'habitat in lands near the site as a result of impacts to the site and the wildlife corridor connecting
these lands').
72. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d at 1157 ("[T]he Corps must make some determination on the issue
of habitat fragmentation, both for ESA and NEPA purposes").
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serve as the basis for a NEPA violation. For example, in the 2008 decision
of Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) violated NEPA by failing to
address substantial questions raised by comments-including comments
from numerous states 7 -- regarding the significance of a rule that set
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for light trucks. 74
Multiple states, cities, and public interest organizations had petitioned for
the review of NHTSA's rule, alleging violations of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, as well as NEPA." The Ninth Circuit determined that the
EA was inadequate, in part because the petitioners raised substantial
questions as to whether the CAFE rule may have-a significant impact on the
environment as shown by evidence in the state agencies' comments, and
NHTSA failed to respond.
The court relied on "compelling scientific evidence" from studies
referred to in comments from state agencies that demonstrated the potential
for "positive feedback mechanisms in the atmosphere" that "may change
73. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'I Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1187 (9th Cir. 2008) ("NHTSA received over 45,000 comments on the NPRM and Draft EA from states,
consumer and environmental organizations, automobile manufacturers and associations, members of
Congress, and private individuals."); see also Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model
Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,578 (Apr. 6, 2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533 and
537) ("The Attorneys General for California, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Maine, Oregon, Vermont, and the New York City Corporation Counsel ... stated that the agency is
obligated to perform an environmental impact statement.").
74. Cir. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1187, 1223 ("The states ... generally argued
that. . . [NHTSA's] FONSI is arbitrary and capricious" because, among other things, it "provided no
foundation for the important inference NHTSA draws between a decrease in the rate of carbon
emissions growth and its finding of no significant impact." (quoting Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep v.
U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted)).
75. Id. at 1180-81 (listing "[e]leven states, the District of Columbia, the City of New York,
and four public interest organizations" as petitioners). See also Average Fuel Economy Standards for
Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566-78. The petitions, submitted directly to the
circuit courts of appeal, were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit. See Brief for the Respondents at 1-3,
Cir. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d 1172 (Nos. 06-71-891, 06-72317, 06-72641, 06-73807, 0673826), 2007 WL 1096332, at *1.
76. Ctr. for BiologicalDiversity, 538 F.3d at 1221 (concluding that "[p]etitioners presented
evidence that continued increase in greenhouse gas emissions may change the climate in a sudden and
non-linear way" and thereby "raised a 'substantial question' as to whether the CAFE standards for light
trucks . . . 'may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor' (quoting Idaho
Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998))); id. at 1225 (noting that although the
agency "acknowledge[d] that carbon emissions contribute to global warming, and it does not dispute the
scientific evidence that Petitioners presented concerning the significant effect of incremental increases in
greenhouse gases," NHTSA failed to justify its conclusion that a small increase in carbon dioxide
emissions is not significant); see also id. at 1220-22 (describing NHTSA's FONSI that was "based
primarily on [a] conclusory assertion--contradicted by evidence in the record" as "markedly deficient").
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the climate in a sudden and non-linear way."" That evidence raised a
substantial question as to whether the CAFE rule might have a significant
impact on the environment. In addition, the court noted that the petitioners
satisfied the "controversy" factor for significance 9 based on the numerous
comments that criticized the agency's analysis,80 including comments from
at least eight different states' Attorneys General and five state agencies.
Because NHTSA failed to provide a reasoned response to the evidence
presented in comments from multiple state agencies, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the EA was inadequate and ordered NHTSA to prepare either a revised
EA or an EIS.82
As with failures to address commenting agencies' specific concerns,
some courts have held that a large volume of critical comments from
agencies may be sufficient to require an EIS. For example, in California v.
U.S. Department of Transportation, the Northern District of California
ruled that the Department of Transportation (DOT) should have prepared an
EIS for Mammoth Mountain Ski Area's proposed expansion of its local
airport to accommodate the growing ski area because numerous adverse
comments from both state and federal agencies raised serious concerns

77. Id. at 1220-22 (noting that the evidence inchided a 2001 report from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC Third Assessment Report), a technical summary
from an IPCC working group, State comments citing an essay that reviewed 928 peer-reviewed
scientific papers, and The Climate Change Futures Report published by the Center for Health and the
Global Environment at Harvard Medical School); see also id. at 1189 ("Commenters also submitted to
NHTSA numerous scientific reports and studies regarding the relationship between climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions and the expected impacts on the environment.").
78. Id. at 1220.
79. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (2011) (stating that "[sjignmficantly as used in NEPA requires
considerations of both context and intensity," and observing that "[t]he degree to which the effects on
the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial" is a factor in evaluating
intensity).
80. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1222 (observing that over 45,000 comments
were submitted in response to NHTSA's proposed rule, and that "[t]he entire dispute between
Petitioners and NHTSA centers on the stringency" of the CAFE standards).
81. See also Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71
Fed. Reg. at 17,566, 17,578 (Apr. 6, 2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, and 537) (listing
comments from the Attorneys General for California, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maine, Oregon and Vermont, as well as comments from the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, California
Air Resources Board, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection).
82. Cir.for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1223-25 ("In light of the evidence in the record,
it is hardly 'self-evident' that a 0.2 percent decrease in carbon emissions .. .is not significant,
[but] .... [i]nstead of providing the required 'convincing statement of reasons,' NHTSA simply asserts
that the insignificance of the effects is 'self-evident."' (quoting Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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about the adverse effects of the expansion. State and federal agencies,
environmental organizations, and individuals commented" on the town of
Mammoth Lakes' draft EA that considered the potential effects of the
expansion.ss Following issuance of a final EA,86 the state of California
continued to express concerns about the airport expansion project." In
response, the town issued a supplemental EA."
California and the Sierra Club challenged the supplemental EA in
separate suits, alleging that DOT violated NEPA by approving the town's
EA and supplemental document.89 The district court ruled that the agency
failed to "address each of the issues raised by the various state and federal
agencies,"90 including comments from the federal Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and the California Department of Fish and Game, and
oral objections of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.9 ' The district court
also concluded that DOT failed to evaluate the controversial proposed
83. California v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(explaining that the town proposed the expansion because it "was concerned that it was losing skiing
visitors to resorts with regularly scheduled commercial air service" and hoped to "increase substantially
the number of visitors to the region").
84. Id. at 973 n.4 (listing "comments from various state and federal agencies that question the
conclusion that the airport project would have no significant environmental impact," including
comments from the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, California Department of
Transportation, California Regional Water Quality Control Board, California Department of Fish and
Game, and Long Valley Fire Protection District).
85. See id. at 971 ("[The Town published a draft [EA] for this expansion
project... conclud[ing] that there would be 'no significant environmental impact caused by the
expansion of the airport that could not be satisfactorily mitigated."' (quoting Administrative Record 88
at 1)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (2006) (explaining that "[a]ny detailed statement required ... for
any major Federal action funded under a program of grants to States shall not be deemed to be legally
insufficient solely by reason of having been prepared by a State agency or official," so long as the state
agency or official has statewide jurisdiction and responsibility for the action, and the responsible federal
official participates in preparation of the statement and independently evaluates the statement).
86. California, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (explaining that the Department of Transportation and
Federal Aviation Administration adopted the town's final EA and signed a FONSI for the project).
87. See id. at 971 n.l (observing that the EA addressed only "the likelihood of birds being
struck by aircraft and the impact of the project on the sage grouse").
88. Id. at 971 (noting that the town issued a document to "address[] a few of [the] concerns, in
a document, which though titled 'Errata,' supplement[ed], rather than correct[ed], the []EA").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 973 (stating that although "[t]he FONSI states that the []EA was 'coordinated with'
these concerned governmental agencies," the record "demonstrates that the []EA ignored or did not
adequately treat their concerns" (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214 (1998))).
91. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pis.' Mot. for Summ. J., California v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
260 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 302CV04621) 2003 WL 25762966; see also California, 260
F. Supp. 2d at 973 n.4 (listing additional comments that questioned the finding of no significant impact
from the National Park Service, California Department of Transportation, California Regional Water
Quality Control Board, California Department of Fish and Game, and Long Valley Fire Protection
District).
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airport expansion's effects on the quality of the human environment. Even
though "some agencies assented to the project" based on the town's
response to comments in the supplemental EA, that support did "not alter
the fact that substantial questions were raised' concerning the EA/FONSI
that should have motivated the DOT to prepare an EIS." The court
explained that although mere opposition to a project is generally
insufficient to require preparation of an EIS, a large number of comments
from federal and state agencies that raise serious substantive concerns could
amount to a significant effect, triggering preparation of an EIS."
Even where NEPA's procedures do not require an EA or EIS, adverse
agency comments have raised questions about categorical exclusions (CE)
to NEPA that encourage courts to require additional analysis from the lead
agency. CEQ's NEPA regulations define a CE as "a category of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
human environment and which have been found to have no such effect. 95
For example, in Sierra Club v. Bosworth, the U.S. Forest Service
promulgated a "fuels" CE authorizing so-called fuel-reduction timber sales
and prescribed bum projects in national forests. The Forest Service
developed the fuels CE to expedite projects aimed at reducing wildfire
risks.97 The Sierra Club alleged that the agency violated NEPA by failing to
prepare either an EA or EIS on timber sales and prescribed burns affecting
between 1,000 and 4,500 acres exempted from individual analysis under the
fuels CE.98 The district court ruled for the Forest Service because NEPA
does not require an EA or EIS for promulgation of a CE, and it concluded
that the Forest Service's reasoning for developing the CE was rational."

92. Calfornia, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 972-73.
93. Id. at 973 n.5 (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208,
1214 (1998)).
94. Id. at 973-74 ('[The volume of comments from and the serious concerns raised by
federal and state agencies specifically charged with protecting the environment support a finding that an
EIS was required in this case.").
95. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011).
96. Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing the Forest
Service as referring to logging and prescribed burning as "fuels reduction").
97. Id. at 1019 (explaining that the Forest Service developed the fuels CE "in response to [an
initiative] announced by President Bush ... to ensure more timely decisions ... in reducing the risk of
catastrophic wildfires by restoring forest health").
98. Id. at 1019-20. Projects covered by the fuels CE would be subject to less stringent
requirements, such as submission of a project file, decision memo, project description, justification for
application of the fuels CE, a finding that no extraordinary circumstances exist, and a description of
public involvement. Id.
99. Id. at 1022.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and concluded that the
Forest Service's failure to adequately explain its decision to promulgate the
fuels CE was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that the Forest
Service promulgated the fuels CE before requesting and reviewing data on
fuels treatment projects from all regional foresters, even though the scoping
process requires such requests and reviews as a prerequisite.' 00 Moreover,
the court ruled that the agency failed to conduct a cumulative impact
analysis'o' or consider the extent to which the environmental impacts
associated with the CE were controversial or uncertain.' 0 2 On the latter
issue, the Ninth Circuit focused on comments from federal and state
agencies, including the federal Fish and Wildlife Service, the Arizona Game
and Fish Department, and the California Resources Agency.'0 o The court
concluded that these comments raised questions of uncertainty concerning
the potential effect of the fuels CE."" According to the court, the large
number of comments, including "strong criticism from several affected
Western state agencies," reflected "controversy" within the meaning of the

100. Id. at 1025-27 (concluding that although the Forest Service was not required to conduct an
EA or EIS for the CE, the agency "failed to demonstrate that it made a 'reasoned decision' to
promulgate" the fuels CE because it based its decision on an inadequate record, and explaining that the
"Forest Service inappropriately decided to establish a categorical exclusion for hazardous fuels
reduction before" requesting information regarding fuels treatment projects from all Regional Foresters
because the "determination that a [CE] was the proper path to take should have taken place after scoping
[and] reviewing") (emphasis in original); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2011) (describing "scoping" as
"an early . . . process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the
significant issues related to a proposed action").
101. Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1027-29 ("The Forest Service concedes that no cumulative
impacts analysis was performed," which is required "[ifn order to assess significance properly.").
102. Id. at 1030; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4-5) (2011) (defining "significantly" as a
measure of a project's context and intensity, and defining "intensity" to include "[tihe degree to which
the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial" and "[t]he
degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain").
103. Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1031 (noting, among other concerns, that the Fish and Wildlife
Service stated "that reconstruction of decommissioned roads or creation of temporary roads could . . .
contribute to increased sedimentation rate in streams," the Arizona Game and Fish Department stated
"that fuel reduction activities have a higher likelihood of affecting the environment than
rehabilitation/stabilization activities," and the California Resources Agency "commented that the Forest
Service has not evaluated the impacts ofunder story treatments on native plants and animals").
104. The court focused on concerns in the agency comments, even though Sierra Club did not
mention the agency comments in its appellate brief. Reply Brief of Appellants Sierra Club & Sierra
Nevada Forest Prot. Campaign, Sierra Club v.Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-16989)
2006 WL 2378632. Yet Sierra Club did cite to the comments in its summary judgment memorandum.
See Plaintiffs Mem. of Points and Auths. In Support of Motion for Summary J., Sierra Club v.
Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 204-cv-02114) 2005 WL 6166847 (noting that comments
from the Council on Environmental Quality and the Fish and Wildlife Service expressed concern about
the Forest Service's data review and methodology, as well as comments from several States that
opposed the CE based on the direct and cumulative environmental impacts).
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CEQ regulations,os and thus the court required the Forest Service to
address the comments prior to promulgating the CE.'0
B. Inadequate EnvironmentalImpact Statements

As shown above, adverse agency comments may result in heightened
scrutiny of an EA. 0 7 Adverse agency comments should play an even larger
role in challenges to the adequacy of an EIS than an EA because both the
lead agency conducting the NEPA analysis and non-lead expert agencies
have explicit statutory duties to seek out or provide comments on an EIS. 08
Thus, a lead agency's failure to address adverse comments would seem to
violate an express provision of the statute.
An agency's complete failure to address agency comments likely makes
an EIS inadequate. An illustration is Western Watershed Project v.

Kraayenbrink, where environmental organizations alleged that the BLM
failed to take the required "hard look" at the environmental effects of revised
federal grazing regulations in its EIS.'" In 2006, BLM promulgated eighteen
amendments to its grazing regulations, including changes that reduced public
involvement, limited the agency's enforcement power, and increased
ranchers' rights to both improvements and water located on public lands."o
105.
106.

Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1032 (citing almost 39,000 comments).
Id.; see also id. at 1034 (noting that the court ultimately remanded the case to the district

court to enter an injunction precluding implementation of the CE until the Forest Service adequately
assessed its significance).
107. Although the plain language of NEPA does not require lead agencies to consider adverse
agency comments for an EA, the CEQ's regulations implementing NEPA do mandate that an "agency
shall involve environmental agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing
assessments." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) ('Trior to any detailed statement, the responsible
Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."); see also id. § 7609(a)
(requiring the EPA to "review and comment in writing on the environmental impact of any matter
relating to duties and responsibilities granted pursuant to this chapter or other provisions of the authority
of the [EPA], contained in any ... major Federal agency action (other than a project for construction) to
which section 4332(2XC) of this title applies").
109. W. Watershed Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472,492 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
BLM's EIS was inadequate because the agency offered "no reasoned analysis whatsoever in support of
its conclusion" that ran counter to comments raised by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA, and
state agencies).
I10. Id. at 479-81 (explaining that the 2006 regulations "narrow the definition of 'interested
public' and remove the requirement that the BLM consult, cooperate, and coordinate with the 'interested
public' with respect to various management decisions;" reduce the number of enforceable standards;
extend the time for BLM to take corrective action measures from 12 to 24 months; increase the
monitoring required before BLM may enforce; create shared ownership between permittee and the
government over permanent range improvements; and grant permittees, rather than the United States,
water rights on public lands).
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The district court ruled that BLM violated NEPA and enjoined BLM from
enforcing the regulations.'" The Ninth Circuit affirmed, centering much of its
analysis on BLM's failure to address adverse comments from federal and
state agencies, as well as BLM's own experts.112
Responding to criticism over reduced public involvement, the court
determined that "BLM offered no reasoned analysis whatsoever in support
of its conclusion-which [was] in direct conflict with the conclusion of its
own experts and sister agency, [the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service].""'3 As
the court explained, BLM also failed to address allegations that the new
regulations would "weaken the ability of the BLM to manage rangelands in
a timely fashion," a claim made by both the Fish and Wildlife Service and
the California Department of Fish and Game.114 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the district court that BLM failed to address the concerns raised by
several adverse agency comments, and thus concluded that the agency's
EIS failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the
proposed amendments." 5
Similarly, in Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. U.S. ForestService, the

Ninth Circuit decided that the Forest Service violated NEPA, even though
the agency revised its EIS on proposed amendments to forest land and
management plans to protect northern goshawk habitat in its Southwest
Region in response to adverse agency comments by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and state wildlife agencies." 6 According to the court, the
Forest Service's EIS failed to disclose and address responsible opposing
scientific viewpoints, in violation of NEPA's requirements."' In 1995, the
111. Id. at 477; see also W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 131217 (D. Idaho 2008) (concluding the BLM violated NEPA for various reasons, including that its EIS
"improperly minimize[d] the negative side effects of limiting public input" and lacked "evidence that the
BLM considered [the] substantial criticisms [of the proposed regulatory changes] before publishing the
proposed rules'.
112. W. Watersheds Project,632 F.3d at 492; see also id. at 479 (describing critical comments
from three consecutive BLM interdisciplinary teams, all of which the BLM ignored or "deleted without
comment" (citing W. WatershedsProject, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1308)).
113. Id. at 492.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 493 ("BLM gave short shrift to a deluge of concerns from its own experts, [the Fish
and Wildlife Service,] the EPA, and state agencies... [because] BLM neither responded to their
considered comments . .. nor made responsive changes to the proposed regulations." (citing Metcalf v.
Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000))).
116. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003).
117. Id. at 1167 (explaining that the agency's adjustment to alternatives in response to the
concerns in the comments did not resolve the agency's additional obligation to respond to responsible
opposing views); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1509(b) ("[F]inal environmental impact statements shall respond
to comments .... The agency shall discuss... any responsible opposing view which was not

adequately discussed in the draft statement.").
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Forest Service's EIS and ROD on the proposed amendments" 8 drew
adverse agency comments concerning the question of whether the northern
goshawk is a habitat generalist"'9 or specialist,120 and the implications of
that determination. 21 Environmental groups challenged the NEPA analysis,
alleging that the Forest Service's EIS failed to adequately justify its
conclusion that goshawks are habitat generalists in the face of agency
comments indicating the hawks might actually be habitat specialists.12 2 The
district court denied the challenge, and the environmental groups

appealed.123
On appeal, the environmentalists made three allegations: (1) the Forest
Service failed to provide a reasoned analysis of the agency comments
maintaining that northern goshawks are habitat specialists; (2) the agency
failed to discuss or respond to specific scientific studies casting doubt on its
conclusion that identified northern goshawks as habitat generalists; and (3)
the Forest Service failed to respond to reasonable scientific views. 124 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the environmentalists.125 Although the Forest
Service received several rounds of adverse comments from the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service and the state wildlife departments of Arizona and New
Mexico,126 the agency omitted the adverse comments from the final EIS.12 7

118. Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 349 F.3d at 1164.
119. Id. at 1161 (explaining that a "habitat generalist" is a species that occupies "a mosaic of
forest types, forest ages, structural conditions, and successional stages . . . throughout the Southwestern
Region's coniferous, deciduous, and mixed forests").
120. Id. at 1164 (noting that a "habitat specialist" is a species that needs a particular type of
habitat; in this case, the adverse agencies commented that the northern goshawk needs "a habitat that
provides mature, tall trees or old-growth stands").
121. See, e.g., id. at 1161 (highlighting the importance of the proper classification of the
northern goshawk's needs because "[o]n the basis of these conclusions, [the Service makes]
recommendations describing the desired balance of forest age classes, or vegetation structural stages"
for the forest plans in the Southwest Region, which then implicates whether the sensitive species
receives adequate protection). For example, if the northern goshawk is a habitat generalist, the species
would prefer "a wide range of forest types." Id. at 1162. In contrast, if the northern goshawk is a habitat
specialist, the species would prefer "foraging in mature, close-canopied forests." Id. at 1161.
122. Id.atl65.
123. Id.atll60.
124. Id.atll65.
125. Id. at 1167-69.
126. See id at 1161, 1163, 1164-65 (describing comment letters from Arizona Game and Fish
Department and the Fish and Wildlife Service "presenting scientific evidence refuting the Service's
conclusion" that goshawks are habitat generalists in response to the Forest Service's scoping notice); see
also id. at 1163 (noting that Arizona's and New Mexico's wildlife agencies submitted a joint comment,
and Crocker-Bedford, a certified wildlife biologist employed by the Forest Service, submitted a
comment, all challenging the conclusion that goshawks are habitat generalists and stating "that '[s]ome
of the issues previously identified . .. are being emphasized again in these comments because

were not adequately addressed or evaluated in the [Draft] EIS.').

.. .
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The court concluded that because the federal and state agencies' comments
cited evidence that directly challenged the scientific basis upon which the
EIS relied, the Forest Service had to disclose the existence of the comments
and respond to the concerns that they raised.'28 The agency's failure to do
so made the EIS inadequate.129
Thus, as demonstrated in Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. U.S. Forest
Service, adverse agency comments may serve to focus a court's attention on
the inadequacies of an agency's NEPA analysis. As another example, in
National Parks & Conservation Association v. Bureau of Land
Management, agency comments critical of BLM's EIS on a land exchange
concerning a proposed landfill spotlighted BLM's failure to sufficiently
address the landfill's potential for eutrophication.130 The proposed landfill
was to be located on a former mining site near Joshua Tree National
Park.' 3' Several parties, including the National Parks Conservation
Association (Association), challenged the land exchange, but BLM and the
Interior Board of Land Appeals approved it despite adverse comments from
The National Park Service.132 The Association challenged BLM's EIS in
district court, 33 and the district court judge ruled in favor of the Association
on some of its NEPA claims.134
A split Ninth Circuit panel then affirmed the district court, ruling that
BLM's EIS failed to sufficiently address the potential for eutrophication. 3
The dissent thought that BLM sufficiently examined the eutrophication

127. Id. at 1168 (explaining that the Forest Service redacted a portion of the Arizona Game and
Fish Department's comment that presented scientific evidence refuting the Forest Service's conclusion,
thus failing to disclose and discuss a responsible opposing view).
128. Id. at 1167 (explaining that the Fish and Wildlife Service, along with other interested
parties, "identified] scientific evidence and opinions contradicting the Service's conclusion that
northern goshawks are habitat generalists," a conclusion on which the Forest Service's final EIS relied).
129. Id. at 1168. According to the court, the Forest Service's summary response to comments
in the draft EIS "fail[ed] to identify and discuss the concern" because it did "not mention or even allude
to the habitat specialist/generalist debate." Any discussions recorded in the planning record likewise did
not resolve the agency's failure to comply with NEPA's disclosure requirements at the EIS stage.
130. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 1073-74 (9th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1783 (2011); see also id at 1070 n.8 (explaining that
"[e]utrophication, in this context, refers to the introduction of nutrients to the desert environment"
through "two potential pathways: (1) landfill waste material; and (2) nitrogen-bearing airborne
emissions").
131. Id. at 1062.
132. Id. at 1063.
133. Id. at 1065.
134. Id. at 1063-64 (stating that the district court granted summary judgment in the
Association's favor because "BLM failed to take a 'hard look' at potential impacts on Bighorn sheep
and the effects of nitrogen enrichment on the nutrient-poor desert environment").
135. Id. at 1074.
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issue,'3 6 but the majority relied on comments from the National Park
Service to conclude that BLM failed to adequately address
eutrophication.'37 Although the Park Service had entered into an agreement
to resolve the project's adverse environmental effects,13 8 the court relied on
the Park Service's comments raising concerns about eutrophication as
evidence that it was a "serious issue." 3 The Ninth Circuit majority
consequently rejected BLM's contention that the EIS addressed
eutrophication in various sections,'" concluding that the EIS was
inadequate because it failed to discuss eutrophication.141
In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, the Ninth Circuit also looked to

adverse agency comments as evidence of an EIS's inadequacy. There, the
tribe and environmentalists claimed that BLM's EIS on a proposed permit
for coal bed methane development in the Powder River Basin in Montana
and Wyoming failed to consider a phased development alternative proposed
in federal and state agency comments.142 In 2002, responding to an
increased interest in coal bed methane as an alternative source of energy,
BLM issued a draft EIS analyzing development of coal bed methane
resources in the Powder River Basin.' 43 The EPA, the Montana Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Indians all
commented that BLM should study a phased development alternative in
addition to the five alternatives it did consider.'" BLM claimed that its final
EIS addressed the commenters' concerns, and that the adverse effects of
136. Id. at 1088 (Trott, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1073-74, 1074 n.14.
138. Id. at 1077 (describing the agreement, after three rounds of adverse comments from the
National Park Service, that provided "a comprehensive, long-term monitoring and mitigation program,
which runs for the life of the project and is specifically tailored to detect and to address any unforeseen
impacts" on Joshua Tree National Park from the proposed landfill and associated operations).
139. Id. at 1074 n.14 ("The dissent's contention that eutrophication is 'not a serious issue' is at
odds with the analysis of both the National Park Service and the IBLA.").
140. Id. at 1073 (noting that "[iun determining whether an EIS fosters informed decisionmaking and public participation, we consider not only its content, but also its form" and in this case "[a]
reader . .. would have to cull through entirely unrelated sections of the EIS and then put the pieces
together" to gain the relevant information).
141. Id. at 1074 ("This patchwork cannot serve as a 'reasonably thorough' discussion of the
eutrophication issue.").
142. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 2007).
143. Id. at 840.
144. Id. (explaining that the draft EIS "analyzed five alternatives in detail," but that "[t]he
commenters suggested that BLM should study an additional alternative, which they called 'phased
development'); see also N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4678, at *22 n.5 (explaining that EPA commented that "we suggest that the range of alternatives include
a phased development alternative" because "[t]here may be significant impacts related to constructing
oil and gas infrastructure due to the 'boom and bust' nature of the coal-bed methane development"
(internal quotations omitted)).
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existing oil and gas leases issued under a 1994 resource management plan
were not subject to challenge in this EIS. 145
The district court decided that BLM's EIS was generally sufficient, but
ruled that the agency's failure to consider the proposed phased-development
alternative identified in agency comments made the EIS inadequate.' The
court therefore issued an injunction limiting development until BLM
revised its EIS.14 7 All parties appealed,148 but the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the district court's partial injunction-which was based on
BLM's failure to consider phased development urged by the government
agencies-was not an abuse of discretion.' 49
Another case that relied on adverse agency comments was Utahns for
Better Transportationv. US. Department of Transportation,a 2002 decision

by the Tenth Circuit ruling that an EIS on a proposed four-lane highway
along the eastern shore of the Great Salt Lake (the Legacy Parkway) was
inadequate.so In that case, Utah's Department of Transportation received
authorization from the Federal Highway Administration to connect the
Legacy Parkway to the interstate highway system, and also obtained a CWA
section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to fill wetlands in
the construction zone.' 5 ' With these federal approvals, the Utah Department
of Transportation prepared an EIS on the project, which the Federal Highway
Administration and the U.S. Army Corps adopted.s 2
145. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 503 F.3d at 840 ("BLM's primary response ... is that 'existing oil and
gas leases' approved pursuant to a 1994 resource management plan included the rights to explore and
develop coal bed methane, and the time for challenging the 1994 decision was passed.").
146. See N. PlainsRes. Council, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4678, at *20-22, 29 (observing that
"[p]hased development, such as controlling the number of rigs operating in an area of developing one
geographic area at a time, as suggested by ... EPA and the Montana department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks . . . would not hinder [the] goal" of "determin[ing] what options, including mitigating measures,
'will help minimize environmental and societal impacts related to [coal bed methane] activities" and
thus the phased development alternative should have been considered in the EIS (quoting BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL STATEWIDE OIL AND GAS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE POWDER RIVER AND BILLINGS RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT PLANS 1-2 (Dec. 2002))).

147. N Cheyenne Tribe, 503 F.3d at 841 (explaining that the "injunction prohibited coal bed
methane development on 93% of the resource area until BLM completed a revised [EIS]," essentially
allowing "the 'phased development' alternative to proceed while BLM decided whether to adopt it").
148. Id. at 842 (noting that the environmentalists and tribe argued that "the district court was
obligated to enjoin all coal bed methane development, not just development on 93% of the resource
area").
149. Id. at 844-46 ("[Tjhe [EIS] basically complied with NEPA, except for its failure to
consider phased development ... [and t]he partial injunction fully remedies this failure.").
150. Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 1161 (explaining that the project required approval from both the Federal Highway
Administration and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers "[b]ecause the Legacy Parkway will connect to
the interstate highway system and will require filling in 114 acres of wetland").
152. Id. at 1161-62
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A local organization challenged both the federal authorization of the
Legacy Parkway and the EIS. 53 The district court denied the challenge,
ruling that the EIS satisfied NEPA and that the Federal Highway
Administration's ROD did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act.154
The local group appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which subsequently reversed
the district court, holding that the EIS failed to consider the effects that the
highway would have on wildlife. 55 In so ruling, the court relied in part on
comments from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Utah
Department of Wildlife Reserve.' 56 The court decided that the EIS's limited
scope of wildlife effects analysis-which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service highlighted-was not sufficient to address the adverse effects of the
project on migratory birds. 57
Similarly, in National Audubon Society v. Department of the Navy,1ss

adverse comments from federal and state agencies emphasized inadequacies
in the Department of the Navy's EIS on a proposed landing field for its
aircraft within five miles of a national wildlife refuge-a winter home for
ahost 100,000 waterfowl. 5 9 Two counties and several environmental
groups sued, claiming that the Navy violated NEPA by failing to adequately
assess the environmental effects of its decision to build the landing field
near the refuge.'6o The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, enjoining the
project until the Navy adequately assessed the effects of the proposed
landing field on migratory waterfowl.' 6'
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Navy failed to take a
"hard look" at the environmental effects of the proposed landing field,
especially in light of the project's close proximity to the wildlife refuge.' 62
The court focused on adverse federal and state agency comments,

153.

Id. at 1162.

154.

Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291 (D. Utah

2001).
155. Ulahnsfor Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1192.
156. Id. at 1179 (noting that the lead agencies considered the effects of the highway on wildlife
only within 1,000 feet of the proposed right of way, "even though [the Fish and Wildlife Service]
presented evidence to the [agencies] that roads can cause significant effects to bird populations as far as
1.24 miles from roadways").
157. Id. ('[L]imiting the wildlife impact analysis so that migratory birds are beyond its scope
renders the [EIS] inadequate.").
158. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 174 (4th Cir. 2005).
159. Id. at 181.
160. Id. at 183.
161. Id.at 181.
162. See id. at 187 (emphasizing that by identifying the nearby region as a national wildlife
refuge, "Congress has expressly found [that the region] . . . provides unique opportunities for observing
and interpreting the biological richness ofthe region's estuaries and wetlands").
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particularly those from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service163 and the North
Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission.164
First, the court decided that the Navy's four winter site-visits and monthlong radar study failed to show that the agency took a "hard look" at the
location and concentration of waterfowl in the vicinity of the proposed
project, as emphasized by Fish and Wildlife Service comments that requested
long-term studies.165 Second, in deciding that the Navy's evaluation of a socalled "bird aircraft strike hazard"'66 was insufficient, the court cited negative
comments from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the North Carolina
Wildlife Resources Commission, and the Department of the Interior.167 Third,
based partly on comments from the North Carolina Wildlife Resources
Commission and the Fish and Wildlife Service,16 8 the court concluded that
the Navy failed to provide adequate support for its conclusion that adverse
effects on waterfowl would be minor.169 Finally, the court relied on the Fish
and Wildlife Service's comments170 in deciding that the Navy's cumulative
impacts analysis was inadequate because it failed to consider the combined
effect of the military operating area and the landing field.17' Consequently,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Navy failed to conduct the required "hard
look" and adequately consider mitigation measures.1 72
163. Id. ('[T]he Fish and Wildlife Service specifically commented that long-term data was
necessary because bird populations vary annually and even within a single migratory season.").
164. Id. at 190 (stating that the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission and the
Department of the Interior criticized the analysis of Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard effects).
165. Id. at 187, 189 (noting that the Fish and Wildlife Service "specifically commented that
long-term data was necessary because bird populations vary" annually and seasonally; the four "site
visits never developed into the careful investigation that a 'hard look' contemplates"; and the Navy
conceded the month-long radar study did not alone provide an adequate assessment of the potential
environmental harm).
166. See, e.g., id. at 189-90 (explaining that "bird aircraft strike hazard" is a measure of birdaircraft encounters which may result in damage to the aircraft and sometimes pilot death or serious injury).
The court noted the importance of properly evaluating bird hazards because "thousands of bird-aircraft
encounters are reported in the United States every year," and "[iln addition to posing obvious risks to the
safety of military aviators," the bird-aircraft encounters are an environmental issue. Id.at 190.
167. Id. at 190-92.
168. Id. at 193 (noting the comments provided scientific studies confirming that "snow geese
are susceptible to aircraft disturbance").
169. Id. at 192 (observing that "[t]he Navy's cursory review of relevant scientific studies ...
further illustrates its failure to take a hard look at the environmental impacts" on the region).
170. Id. at 197 (stating that "[t]he Fish and Wildlife Service has expressed concern about harm
that the proposed [military operating area] by itself would cause to resident waterfowl . .. creating cause
for concern regarding what would happen when the effects of the [military operating area] and
[proposed additional landing field] are combined").
171. Id. at 197-98 (explaining that a "holistic view of the []EIS makes [it] particularly
apparent" that the cumulative impact analysis was deficient).
172. Id at 202-03 (rejecting the district court's "sweeping injunction" and instead instructing the
district court to narrow the injunction to permit some activity by the Navy while it revised the NEPA analysis).
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The foregoing cases demonstrate that agency comments critical of a
lead agency's NEPA analysis may have a significant influence on judicial
review of an EIS. The Ninth Circuit has routinely concluded that a lead
agency's failure to consider or address adverse agency comments may itself
serve as the basis for a NEPA violation.' 73 Even where the lead agency's
response-or failure to respond-to adverse comments is not itself the basis
for a NEPA violation, the fact that other agencies are critical of the lead
agency's analysis often signals to the court that a NEPA analysis is
deficient.'74
III. ADVERSE COMMENTS FROM LEAD AGENCY STAFF

Like concerns raised by comment agencies, adverse comments from an
agency's own staff may attract a court's attention because they reflect
internal agency disagreement. Even if an agency responds to adverse
comments from its own staff, some courts have held that responses not
adequately addressing those comments can render an EIS insufficient.
For example, in 2012 the Ninth Circuit determined in Pacific Rivers
Council v. U.S. Forest Service that the Forest Service's EIS on 2004

revisions to the Sierra Nevada National Forest Plan was inadequate because
it failed to consider the environmental consequences of the revisions on
individual species of fish-an issue raised in comments from the Forest
Service's own staff.'s In January 2001, the Forest Service had issued an
EIS recommending revisions to the forest plan to "conserve and repair the
aquatic and riparian ecosystems," among other goals.' 76 In November 2001,
under a new administration,'" the Chief of the Forest Service directed the
173. See W. Watershed Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 493 (9th Cir. 2010); Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1227 (9th Cir. 2008); Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003).
174. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Nat'l Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 131
S.Ct. 1783 (2011); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v.
Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1031 (9th Cir. 2007); Nat'I Audubon Soc'y, 422 F.3d at 187-89; Ocean
Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 402 F.3d 846, 866 (9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d
1104, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002); Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1180
(10th Cir. 2002).
175. Pac. Rivers Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F.3d 1012, 1028, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting the omission "was specifically brought to the attention of the Forest Service in the letter written
by its Washington staff' in the Office for Watershed, Fish, Wildlife, Air and Rare Plants, yet "the Forest
Service 'entirely failed to consider' environmental consequences of the 2004 [revisions] on individual
species of fish").
176. Id. at 1015-16
177. Id. at 1015 ("[U]nder the administration of newly elected President Bush, the Chief of the
Forest Service asked for a review of the 2001 Framework.").
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regional forester to amend the forest plan revisions to address fire-related
issues and reduce the adverse effects on various permit holders.'78 In 2004,
the Forest Service issued a new EIS and ROD on the forest plan revisions
that reflected "substantial differences" from the 2001 revisions, authorizing
more logging and logging-related activities while reducing grazing
restrictions.' 79 Pacific Rivers Council then challenged the 2004 EIS,
alleging that it did not sufficiently analyze the environmental consequences
for fish and amphibians. 80
The district court ruled in favor of the Forest Service, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the 2004 EIS violated NEPA by failing to
address the environmental effects that the 2004 revisions had on fish.'"' The
court observed that the Forest Service's own staff had criticized the draft
version of the 2004 EIS for omitting a discussion of the effects that logging
and logging-related activities have on fish.182 However, the agency failed to
respond to those concerns in its final EIS.'8 3 In fact, the 2004 EIS was
devoid of any discussion of how logging impacts fish,1'" even though the
178. Id. at 1016 (stating that the Chief of the Forest Service "directed the Regional Forester to
reevaluate the 2001" amendments to consider fire related issues as well as "to 'reduce the unintended
and adverse impacts" on grazing permit holders, recreation users, and local communities).
179. Id. at 1017-19 (explaining that the revisions resulted in amendments that allow
"harvesting of substantially more timber," "harvesting of larger trees," "substantial[] increases [to] the
total acre-age to be logged," additional logging roads, and reduced grazing restrictions).
180. Id. at 1020.
181. The Court explained:
[The complete lack of such analysis of the likely impact on individual species of
fish in the 2004 EIS, and the lack of any explanation in the 2004 EIS why it is not
"reasonably possible" to perform some level of analysis of such impact, we have
no choice but to conclude that the Forest Service failed to take the requisite "hard
look."
Id. at 1034.
182. Id. at 1017 (describing a letter from Forest Service staff in the Washington D.C. Office for
Watershed, Fish, Wildlife, Air and Rare Plants, that stated "[t]here needs to be a discussion of the effects
of the new alternatives on riparian ecosystems, streams, and fisheries" and based on the proposed action
alternatives, "there is a high likelihood that there will be significant and measurable direct, indirect, and
cumulative effects on the environment, which need to be analyzed and disclosed in this document").
183. Id. at 1017 ("The Forest Service issued the 2004 EIS ... without adding the discussion of
'riparian ecosystems, streams and fisheries' that the staff letter had said was needed."). The court
specifically noted that:
The explicit promise to analyze effects 'on species dependent on aquatic
habitats' . . . and the absence of any such analysis ... is puzzling.. .. [especially

because] it was a mistake that was specifically brought to the attention of the
Forest Service in the letter written by its Washington staff.
Id. at 1028. The court also looked to the analysis in the 2001 EIS, which did address the
effect of the forest plan revisions on fish and amphibians. Id
184. Id. at 1025 ("In stark contrast to the 2001 EIS, the 2004 EIS contains no analysis
whatsoever of environmental consequences of the 2004 [revised amendments] for individual species of
fish." (emphasis added)).
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2004 revisions permitted increased logging and logging-related activities
that would exacerbate adverse effects on fish and amphibians.' 8 ' Because of
this omission and the lack of any reasoning for not supplying the missing
analysis, 186 the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service's EIS violated
NEPA.187
Similarly in Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass'n v. Federal

Aviation Administration, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) failed to address its own studies and did not follow
its own procedures for responding to comments, making its EIS on a
proposed bomber-training initiative inadequate.' 88 The Davis Mountains
Trans-Pecos Heritage Association and others alleged that the EIS, prepared
by the U.S. Air Force and adopted by the FAA, violated NEPA by failing to
analyze the effects of "wake vortices" (trails of disturbed air) on ground
structures. 89 The Fifth Circuit consolidated two district court decisions,
along with a direct appeal from an FAA order.'" The court then ruled that
the EIS violated NEPA because it did not adequately address the effects of
wake vortices on ground structures.19 ' The court also concluded that the EIS
185. Id. at 1017; see also id. at 1025 (noting that "[o]f particular importance, the 2004
[revisions] allow[] an additional 4.9 billion board feet of green and salvage timber harvesting during the
first two decades, much of it conducted nearer streams, compared to the 2001 [amendments]").
186. Id. at 1030 (stating that "[t]he Forest Service has provided almost the opposite of an
explanation, for it promised such an analysis and then failed to provide it").
187. Id. at 1034 ("[The Forest Service 'entirely failed to consider' the environmental
consequences of the 2004 [revisions] on individual species of fish ... [but] did take a hard look at
environmental consequences on amphibians in the 2004 EIS, in compliance with NEPA.").
188. Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., Nos. 02-60288,
03-10506, 03-10528, 2004 WL 2295986, at *18-19 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004). The "Realistic Bomber
Training Initiative (RBTI)" proposed to "provide airspace and ground-based assets for realistic and
integrated B-52 and B-I Bomber flight training within 600 miles of Barksdale and Dyess Air Force
Bases," and included an operations area and training route for pilots to practice low-altitude navigation
and maneuvers. Id. at *6-7; see also id. at *18-19 (remanding to the Air Force and FAA "to prepare a
supplemental EIS which adequately addresses wake vortex impacts and FAA comments as required by
CEQ and Air Force regulations"); id. at *6 n.* ("[Plursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court determined
[the] opinion should not be published and is not precedent except" for the doctrine of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case).
189. Id. at *11 (explaining that the petitioners alleged "wake vortices damage ground structures
like the windmills used by ranchers to provide water to livestock and wildlife").
190. Id. at *7 n.2.
191. Id. at *11-13 (explaining that "[tihe Air Force is entitled to rely on its own qualified
experts' reasonable opinions in determining the significance of impacts," but because the Air Force
relied on documents that did not present "a reliable picture of the impact of wake vortices on surface
structures," the EIS "misinform[ed] both public participation and the Air Force's conclusion" and "thus
this portion of the EIS is inadequate"); see also id. at *11-12 (rejecting an e-mail from the Boeing
Company that alluded to a Boeing study because "the e-mail alone cannot provide an adequate basis for
the Air Force's conclusion," and rejecting the Air Force's estimates from a graph that "came from a
1949 aerodynamics text by James Dwinnell" because "the Air Force did not include the equation or its
inputs in the EIS or administrative record").
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failed to comply with the Air Force's own NEPA regulations by not
satisfactorily responding to FAA comments. 192 In reaching its decision, the
Fifth Circuit relied on comments by the FAA's own expert.'93
Both PacicRivers Council and Davis v. FAA demonstrate that even if

a lead agency responds to agency comments that criticize its analysis, the
lead agency can still violate NEPA by failing to adequately respond to
internal concerns. Critical comments from expert agencies may raise
judicial awareness to specific issues in the lead agency's EIS, and adverse
comments from an agency's own staff may have the same effect. This is a
sensible result, considering that the agency deference is in large part based
on agency expertise. 14When an agency's own staff critiques the analysis in
an EIS-such as the letter from the Forest Service's staff in Pacific Rivers
Council-or concedes inadequacies in the analysis-like the Air Force's
own expert in Davis v. FAA---courts have taken those concerns seriously.
IV. FAVORABLE AGENCY COMMENTS

Just as agency comments critical of a lead agency's analysis may
influence courts to conclude that the analysis violates NEPA, agency
comments that support a lead agency's analysis are likely to lead courts to
find compliance with NEPA. This Part discusses cases where agency
comments that agree with lead agencies' analysis influenced judicial
reasoning.
In 2003,

in Mid States Coalition for Progress v.

Surface

TransportationBoard,the Eighth Circuit upheld the Surface Transportation
Board's EIS on a proposal to construct a rail-line extension to rehabilitate
existing rail lines in Minnesota and South Dakota and to construct a new
rail line to reach coal mines in Wyoming's Powder River Basin. The EIS

192. Id. at *13-14 (explaining that "Air Force regulations ... provide that an EIS must include
'responses to comments on the Draft EIS by modifying the text and referring in the appendix to where
the comment is addressed or providing a written explanation in the comments section,"' but the FAA
"did not refer in the appendix to where the FAA's comments were addressed or provide any written
explanation" and "neglect[ed] much of its responsibilities under [its own] regulation" (quoting 32 C.F.R.
§ 989.19(d))).
193. Id. at *12 (noting that "the Air Force's own expert, Dr. Ojars Skujins, admit[ed]" that the
bombers could generate wind speeds much higher than that predicted in the EIS, and "that the chart
generated by the Air Force based on the .. . equation [created by another FAA expert] is
'oversimplified' and 'does tend to underestimate the maximum vortex strength"').
194. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("[T]he well-reasoned views of the
agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944))).
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195
The
was based in part on comments from EPA that supported the project.s
city of Rochester, among other petitioners,'" alleged that the Surface
Transportation Board improperly calculated the ambient noise and failed to
account for different noise levels in urban as opposed to rural areas.19 ' The
district court upheld the board's calculations, concluding that the agency
supported its analysis "by explaining that noise is not additive."198 The
court relied on comments from EPA that supported the lead agency's
reasoning to conclude that the board properly decided not to separately
measure ambient noise for every community located along the proposed rail
project.'9 9
Even if other agencies do not comment in support of a lead agency's
analysis, as occurred in Mid States Coalitionfor Progress, courts may rely
on a lack of critical agency comments to justify the adequacy of the NEPA
analysis. For example, in Theodore Roosevelt ConservationPartnershipv.
Salazar, the D.C. Circuit upheld BLM's EIS and ROD on a proposed
management plan for natural gas development in Wyoming. 20 Several
environmental groups claimed that BLM's EIS and ROD violated NEPA by
using an outdated method for estimating the amount of pollutants the
proposed drilling activities and related development would emit. 20' The
district court upheld BLM's EIS because it determined that calculating the
project's effect on ozone levels is a complicated measurement and that the

195. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 532 (8th Cir. 2003)
(describing the proposal "to construct approximately 280 miles of new rail line . .. and to upgrade
nearly 600 miles of existing rail line in Minnesota and South Dakota").
196. Id. at 534 (listing the city of Rochester, the Mayo Foundation, and Olmstead County as
petitioners).
197. Id. at 536 (explaining that the EIS "used noise levels in rural South Dakota as its baseline
for ambient noise" but that Rochester argued "since the ambient noise levels in an urban area are higher,
it was arbitrary . .. to use the lower rural levels").
198. Id.
199. Id. at 537 (noting that EPA "has stated that 'adding a 60 decibel sound to a 70 decibel
sound only increases the total sound pressure level less than one-half decibel' and "[e]ven if we credit
Rochester's estimate that its own ambient noise level is 59 decibels, that would add less than one-half
decibel to those receptors that [the lead agency] has determined will experience average train noise of 70
decibels").
200. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 502-03 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (explaining the project was "designed to manage the resources of more than 270,000 acres of
publicly and privately owned land in south-central Wyoming"). See also id. at 505 (describing the area
as "contain[ing] valuable oil and natural gas deposits, provid[ing] habitat to many species of wildlife,
suppl[ying] grazing land for local ranchers' herds, and support[ing] various human endeavors such as
big game hunting and wildlife observation"); id. (noting that the ROD "anticipates the Bureau approving
approximately 2000 new natural gas wells in the project area over the span of 30 to 50 years").
201. Id. at 510 (stating that the environmental groups maintained that the Scheffe method, a
calculation "developed in 1988" used by the BLM to "estimate[] the effect the proposed development
would have on ozone concentrations," was outdated).
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choice of calculation methods is one properly left to the agency's
expertise.202 The D.C. Circuit also rejected the environmentalists' claim
because BLM explained its use of the older model, 203 and NEPA does not
require agencies to use the best scientific methods available. 20 Further, the
court noted that the federal and state agencies contacted for comment
declined to make any judgment about BLM's use of the old model.205
. Courts are thus more likely to uphold a lead agency's NEPA analysis if
other agencies have commented in support of its analysis. The Theodore
Roosevelt ConservationPartnershipdecision suggests that courts may even
interpret an agency's decision not to comment as indicating the adequacy of
the lead agency's analysis. The outcomes of these cases are consistent with
our thesis that agency comments will trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.
V. OUTCOMES CONTRARY TO AGENCY COMMENTS

Adverse agency comments do not always cause courts to find NEPA
violations. In this Part we explain cases in which, contrary to our thesis, a
court made a NEPA determination that was inconsistent with adverse
agency comments. Although some cases diverge from our thesis that courts
afford heightened scrutiny to concerns raised by adverse agency comments,
most do not actually undermine the theory. In fact, some of the cases
demonstrate that inter-agency comments prompt the lead agency to address
the inadequacy of its environmental analysis. Adverse agency comments
can help a lead agency avoid a NEPA violation by putting it on notice of
deficiencies in its environmental analysis. Thus, even cases where adverse
agency comments do not cause courts to find a NEPA violation support the
overarching conclusion that adverse comments warrant close scrutiny from
lead agencies, litigants, and courts.

202. Id.; see also Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 605 F. Supp. 2d 263,
273-74 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[Ozone] formation is a complex atmospheric chemistry process that varies
greatly due to meteorological conditions and the presence of ambient atmospheric concentrations of
many chemical species.. . . Choosing a more accurate method of analysis is precisely the type of
decision best left to agency expertise." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
203.

Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship, 616 F.3d at 510.

204. Id. at 511 (clarifying that CEQ regulations "require[] agencies to ensure the scientific
integrity of their environmental impact statements" but do "not require that an agency employ the best,
most cutting-edge methodologies").
205. Id. ("Before undertaking the analysis, the [BLM] contacted various interested agencies,
including the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Park Service, and the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality, . . . [n]one objected to using the Scheffe method.").
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A. Upholdingan Environmental Assessment Despite Adverse
Agency Comments

Adverse agency comments that do not expressly contradict or
challenge a lead agency's analysis can support a court decision finding
NEPA compliance. For example, Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers involved a challenge to the Army Corps of Engineers'
EA on a CWA section 404 permit to fill wetlands for a residential
development, and to mitigate the resulting adverse effects by creating a
freshwater wetland system. 206 The Ninth Circuit determined that comment
letters from the Fish and Wildlife Service and EPA did not explicitly
question the feasibility or benefits of the proposed freshwater system, and
thus did not raise questions of uncertainty that might require an EIS.207 In
response to its proposed permit, the Corps received comments from the Fish
and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and EPA,
among other agencies. 208 However, after multiple meetings between the
Corps and various federal and state agencies,209 as well as modifications to
permit conditions, the federal agencies decided not to object to the
permit. 210 Environmental groups sued, claiming that the Corps violated both
the CWA and NEPA when it issued the permit based on the corresponding
EA/FONSI. 21' The district court ruled that the Corps violated NEPA
because the proposed mitigation was not tested or fully developed, and
there was significant controversy about the nature and effect of the
proposed activity.2 12
206. Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.
2000), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1176-78
(9th Cir. 2000) (describing the proposed project to dredge and fill 21.4 acres of wetlands to build
"residential areas, a marina, and numerous commercial developments," and mitigate the adverse effects
of creating a "52-acre fresh water wetland complex").
207. Idatlll9-21.
208. Id. at 1111 (discussing comments from the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine
Fisheries Service, and EPA that "expressed concern that . . . the notice of intent and the permit
application did not contain a sufficiently detailed analysis of project alternatives and did not provide a
comprehensive evaluation of the cumulative impacts attributable to the entire development project").
209. Id. at 1111-12 (noting that "the Corps met with representatives of the [Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Marine Fisheries Service], EPA, and the California Department of Fish and Game" in
November 1991 and April 1992).
210. Id. (observing that the developer "agreed to inclu[de] ... various special permit conditions
proposed by [the National Marine Fisheries Service] and the EPA" and "EPA, [the National Marine
Fisheries Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service] decided not to object further to the issuance of the
permit").
211.

Id.atl109.

212. Id. at 1113 ("The district court found that the Corps had violated NEPA by improperly
limiting the scope of its analysis ... [and] the Corps decision to issue an EA rather than an EIS was
arbitrary and capricious.").
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The Corps appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, rejecting the district
court's emphasis on adverse agency comments as raising a substantial
question about the adequacy of the mitigation measures and stating that the
district court mischaracterized the substance of those comments.2 13 Closely
analyzing the Fish and Wildlife Service and EPA comments, the court
decided that they only requested additional information, instead of
questioning the feasibility of the freshwater wetland system as a mitigation
measure.2 14 To the extent that the agency comments raised concerns about
the feasibility of the freshwater system, the court concluded that the Corps
adequately considered those concerns, and therefore the court found no
NEPA violation.215

Similarly, in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision rejecting a challenge to an EA
on a proposed housing development and golf course authorized by a Corps
of Engineers' permit along the Snake River in Wyoming. 16 The circuit
court explained that the comments from EPA and the Forest Service did not
directly challenge the Corps's analysis in the EA.2 17 Environmental groups
claimed that the Corps should have prepared an EIS on the permit for the
development near bald eagle nesting territory.1 In challenging the Corps's
FONSI, the environmental groups pointed to comments from EPA and the
Forest Service.
The district court upheld the Corps's EA and FONSI because the
agency completed "extensive examination of... potential impacts and
responses to comments." 220 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding there
was no substantial uncertainty or controversy that would trigger the need
for an EIS.221 The court identified the agency comments as expressing
general concerns about the project's effects and some of the data relied on
213. Id.atlll0,1120.
214. Id. at 1120 (stating that EPA requested information such as "an evaluation of the quantity
and quality of wildlife habitat the freshwater marsh would provide" and a "[d]etermination of the
contaminants which would enter the freshwater marsh if surface run-off, remediated groundwater and/or
reclaimed wastewater were used," and that the Fish and Wildlife Service's comment "suggested that the
plan for the freshwater system be revised to allow for urban runoff to be diverted around the system, but
it did not express any opinion on the feasibility of the system").
215. Id. ('Tihe Corps considered each of these issues and relied on substantial evidence in
making its determination that the freshwater system was feasible").
216. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1263-64 (explaining that the proposed development required a section 404 permit to
place twelve weirs in a river to stabilize the bank and prevent erosion).
219. Id. at 1275.
220. Answering Brief of the Fed. Defendants-Appellees at 21-22, Greater Yellowstone
Coalition,359 F.3d 1257 (No. 03-8034) 2003 WL 23723859.
221.

Greater Yellowstone Coal., 359 F.3d at 1275.
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in the EA, but "[n]either comment provide[d] 'evidence .. . [that] cast
222
serious doubt upon the reasonableness of [the Corps's] conclusions."'
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Corps addressed these comments by
adopting monitoring requirements that forced the agency to modify the
proposed plan if there were any unacceptable adverse effects on the eagle
population. 223 The fact that the Corps addressed the concerns in adverse
agency comments, thereby avoiding a NEPA violation, supports the thesis
that adverse agency comments receive considerable judicial deference. The
difference in this case was that the lead agency responded by modifying its
proposal. As a result, the environmental groups failed to show that the
Corps should have prepared an EIS despite agency comments critical of the
Corps's FONSI.224
Even if adverse agency comments directly question a ,lead agency's
analysis, courts may uphold the EA so long as the lead agency considers
and addresses those comments. For example, in Akiak Native Community v.
U.S. Postal Service, Alaska Native communities challenged the U.S. Postal
Service's EA for a hovercraft demonstration project.225 Despite criticism
from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Alaska Department of Fish
and Game, the Postal Service issued an EA and FONSI. 2 26 The communities
227
lost their challenge to the Postal Service's EA in district court.'" They
appealed, emphasizing comments from the Fish and Wildlife Service as
evidence that "the EA's conclusions were faulty." 228
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the
Postal Service, explaining that the agency "is not required ... to defer to the
222. Id. (quoting Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 736 (9th Cir.
2001)); see also id. (explaining that "[w]hile EPA raised general concerns about the impact of the weirs
and the U.S. Forest Service geomorphologist criticized aspects of the Ayres report, we do not believe
these comments obligated the Corps to evaluate the impact of the weirs further in an EIS").
223. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 359 F.3d at 1276-77 ("In light of the evident difficulty in
predicting eagle reactions before [the project] begins, the Corps could justifiably determine that these
mitigation measures 'constitute an adequate buffer' against adverse impacts to bald eagles." (quoting
Weltands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000))).
224. Id. at 1277.
225. Akiak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 213 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that the Postal Service proposed "an experimental program that delivers non-priority mail by surface
hovercraft instead of by fixed-wing aircraft to eight remote Alaska Native villages on the Kuskokwin
River and two of its tributaries").
226. Id. (noting that the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game "disagreed with the [EA's] conclusion that the impacts on fish, wildlife, and subsistence activities
would be insignificant").
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1146 ("Plaintiffs suggest that the [EA's] analysis does not support the [FONSI]
because . .. the [Fish and Wildlife Service], an agency with expertise in environmental issues, suggested

that the [EA's] conclusions were faulty.").

38

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 37:005

Fish and Wildlife Service's conclusions." 229 Instead, "NEPA requires only
that the responsible agency 'consider [] these comment agencies' initial
concerns, address[] them, and 'explain[] why it found them
unpersuasive."' 230 The court ruled that because the EA "carefully
analyze[d] [the potential long-term disturbance of roosting waterfowl, as
raised by the Fish and Wildlife Service's comments] and conclude[d] that a
short-term disturbance of roosting is the probable impact, ,,231 such an effect
would not be significant, and the Postal Service adequately addressed any
concerns.232 Just as the adverse agency comments triggered heightened
233 in this
scrutiny from the lead agency in Greater Yellowstone Coalition,

case the Fish and Wildlife Service's adverse comments elicited a focused
response from the Postal Service that apparently addressed the comment
agency's concerns, thus avoiding a NEPA violation. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the EA "mustered sufficient record support" for its FONSI
and upheld the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS.234
B. Adequate EIS Analysis DespiteAdverse Comments

Although somewhat rare, there are a few cases that uphold a lead
agency's EIS as sufficient even though adverse agency comments criticized
aspects of the EIS's analysis. These cases are not, however, completely
contrary to the notion that adverse agency comments generate increased
scrutiny because in each of the cases discussed below the lead agency
seriously considered the adverse comments. These decisions do seem to
afford less importance to adverse agency comments, but at a minimum the
agency comments require close consideration from both the lead agency
and the reviewing court.
Some courts have upheld a lead agency's EIS in the face of adverse
agency comments so long as the lead agency cogently addressed those
comments. For example, in Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, the

Tenth Circuit upheld the FAA's EIS on proposed special use airspace
changes to the National Airspace System in Colorado 235 even though BLM,
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.at 1147.
233. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
234. See Akiak Native Cmty , 213 F.3d at 1146-47 ("[D]eference is accorded agency
environmental determinations not because the agency possesses the substantive expertise, but because
the agency's decision-making process is accorded a 'presumption of regularity."' (quoting Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971))).
235. Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1027 (10th Cir. 2001).
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the Department of the Interior, and other agencies submitted comments
concerning potential adverse effects on sensitive wilderness areas in the
vicinity.236 Numerous environmental and other groupS237 challenged the
FAA's EIS,238 claiming that the EIS failed to sufficiently analyze adverse
effects on wilderness areas in the vicinity of the proposed airspace changes.
The groups cited adverse comments by BLM and other agencies for
support. 239
The Tenth Circuit recognized that although NEPA "requires agencies
preparing environmental impact statements to consider and respond to the
comments of other agencies," it does not force agencies "to agree with
them." 240 Because the FAA considered the adverse agency comments, but
reasonably concluded that the adverse effects would not be significant, the
court upheld the EIS's analysis of the anticipated impacts on nearby
wilderness areas.24 1
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Custer County may reflect particular
sensitivity to matters of national security, since the court explained that
"[w]e recognize the action at issue here technically is not military action,"
but noted that "the FAA is instructed to determine whether airspace is
necessary to national defense in consultation with the Defense
Department." 242 The court also observed that "[u]nder these circumstances,
we believe the political question doctrine precludes us from secondguessing or interfering with the FAA's decision [that] the [proposed
special-use changes are] necessary to provide airspace for military
training." 243 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit determined that despite the
adverse agency comments, the FAA did not violate NEPA because it
236. Id. at 1038 (stating that petitioners pointed to agency comments concerned about potential
adverse effects of the proposed change on "the unique natural, quiet, aesthetic, visual and recreational
resources associated with certain wilderness areas" and "criticizing .. .FAA for not fully analyzing
those impacts").
237. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024 (10th
Cir. 2001) (No. 01-652) 2001 WL 34116045, *ii (listing the petitioners as Custer County Action
Association; National Airspace Coalition; The Wilderness Society, Custer County Airport Authority;
The Board of County Commissioners of Custer County, Colorado; La Vets Peace of Air Alliance;
Huerfano Valley Citizens Alliance; Wolf Spring Ranchers, Inc.; and Custer County Bison).
238.

Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n, 256 F.3d at 1027.

239. Id.at 1038.
240. Id.
241. Id. ("[T]he record in this case verifies that the agencies identified possible noise impacts..
including [impacts on] wilderness areas ... and reasonably determined, after considering public and
agency comment alike, that any impact on these areas would be insignificant," so "we therefore uphold"
the EIS).
242. Id. at 1031.
243. Id. (noting that the court is "free to review whether, in making that decision, the FAA
acted within the scope of its powers, followed its own regulations, and complied with the Constitution").
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considered the agency comments but reasonably came to a different
conclusion, and because the national security issues warranted greater
deference to the FAA's decisions.
Ensuing Tenth Circuit decisions have limited Custer County, giving less
deference to lead agency reasoning that is inconsistent with agency comments
that are critical of an EA or EIS. For example, in Davis v. Mineta,24 the
Tenth Circuit noted that while "NEPA 'requires agencies preparing [EISs] to
consider and respond to the comments of the other agencies, not to agree with
them,"' 24 5 "it is also true that a reviewing court 'may properly be skeptical as
to whether an EIS's conclusions have a substantial basis in fact if the
responsible agency has apparently ignored the conflicting views of other
agencies having pertinent expertise."'4 Consequently, later decisions of the
Tenth Circuit balance deference to a lead agency's response to adverse
comments with deference to a comment agency's area of expertise.
Later district court cases within the Tenth Circuit have likewise moved
away from the reasoning in Custer County. Some courts have applied the
Tenth Circuit's language from Custer County but added additional reasoning
for upholding the lead agency's NEPA analysis despite critical. agency
comments. For example, in WildEarth Guardians v. US. ForestService, the
district court upheld the Forest Service's EIS on proposed drainage wells and
a ventilation shaft to minimize methane gas levels in a proposed expansion of
the West Elk Mine in Colorado, even though the analysis ignored EPA
comments suggesting an alternative to venting the methane directly into the
atmosphere.2 47 WildEarth claimed that the Forest Service violated NEPA by
failing to consider the capture of methane gas emissions because .capturing
methane was a reasonable alternative to venting, and because it would reduce
methane levels within the mine, as indicated by the EPA's comments. 248 The
district court rejected WildEarth's claim not only because the Forest Service
coherently addressed the EPA's concerns, 249 but also because the Forest
244. Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2002).
245. Id. at 1123 (quoting Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n, 256 F.3d at 1038).
246. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir.
1983)).
247. WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1227-28 (D. Colo.
2011); id. at 1228 (describing EPA comments that "acknowledged the safety concerns relating to
venting of methane but recommend[ing] that the .. . EIS 'identify the magnitude of the emissions and
discuss alternatives,' specifically capture of the gas" because of the "significance of methane as a potent
greenhouse gas and the success of [other] effort[s] in adding capture technology to a number of active
coal mines").
248. Id. at 1236; see also id. at 1238 (explaining that WildEarth "not(ed] that the EPA
suggested ways of addressing the leasing challenges").
249. Id. at 1238 ("Forest Service met with and engaged in information exchanges with the EPA
and investigated EPA's suggestions.").
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Service provided reasoning for its own determination and deferred to BLM,
the agency with final authority over the leasing decisions.2 50
Other district courts have applied the reasoning in Custer County, but
not with dispositive effects. For example, in Wyoming Outdoor Council,
Powder River Basin Resources Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

the district court rejected an Army Corps EA on a CWA section 404 general
permit for discharges associated with oil and gas development partially due
to adverse agency comments. 2 51 Several environmental groups, 252 relying on
comments submitted by the EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
claimed that the Corps violated NEPA by failing to consider the cumulative
impact of the proposed general permits on non-wetland resources and water
quality.253 Although the district court cited the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Custer County, the court still relied on the adverse agency comments to
support its conclusion that the Corps failed to evaluate the cumulative
impacts on non-wetland resources.2 54 Hence Custer County appears to have
a limited effect within the Tenth Circuit.
On the other hand, in Fuel Safe Washington v. Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, the Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) EIS on a proposed natural gas
pipeline and ancillary facilities in northwest Washington despite adverse
agency comments. 2 55 The company alleged that FERC's EIS was deficient
because it failed to address concerns raised by the EPA and the Washington
Department of Ecology concerning the scope of alternatives.256 FERC
responded by expanding its discussion of alternatives,257 but the EPA still had
concerns that the EIS did not contain a sufficient range of reasonable
250. Id. ("[Tihe record shows that the Forest Service considered the EPA's suggestions but
made its own determinations in consultation with the BLM .... There was significant evidence on the
record ... that capture of the methane ... was a remote and impractical option .... .").
251. Wyo. Outdoor Council, Powder River Basin Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238, 1243 n.2 (D. Wyo. 2005).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1243 n.2 (explaining that the environmental groups "asked the [c]ourt to overturn
the Corps' FONSI based in part on the comments submitted to the Corps by the [EPA] and FWS
regarding the potential cumulative impacts of [the general permit]").
254. Id. ("In this case, the comments provided by EPA and FWS lend further support to the
[c]ourt's determination that the Corps' failure to evaluate cumulative impacts to non-wetland resources
was arbitrary and capricious." (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002))).
255. Fuel Safe Wash. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 389 F.3d 1313, 1319-22 (10th Cir.
2004) (noting that FERC orders are reviewable by circuit courts, and in this case the company petitioned
for review in the Ninth Circuit but was transferred to the Tenth Circuit).
256. Id. at 1326 (noting that EPA submitted comments on the draft EIS criticizing FERC's
evaluation of alternatives as perfunctory).
257. Id. ("In response to [EPA's comment], FERC expanded its discussion of several of the
alternatives.").
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alternatives, such as alternative Canadian routes. 258 Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that the EIS was adequate. 2 59 The court explained that the EPA's
comments did not expressly challenge FERC's analysis, 260 and ultimately
deferred to FERC's reasoning, concluding that there was no NEPA
violation.26 1
Although a lead agency's complete failure to respond to adverse
comments by other agencies will often produce a judicial determination that
an EIS is inadequate, that result varies, and a few courts have upheld an EIS
even in the face of adverse agency comments. For example, in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration, the

Second Circuit upheld the FAA's EIS on a proposal to close an existing
airport and construct a new airport, even though it appeared that the FAA
failed to address and discuss adverse agency comments.262
Several environmental groups challenged the FAA's EIS on the project
for failing to: (1) adequately evaluate the alternatives; (2) consider indirect
and cumulative effects; and (3) disclose scientific evidence that the
proposed mitigation efforts were not likely to offset the anticipated loss of
wetlands.2 63 The Second Circuit denied their petition, even though adverse
agency comments from the EPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service
supported the environmental groups' claims. 26 The court did not analyze
the FAA's failure to address agency comments. 2 65 This result might have
258. Id. at 1324; see also id. at 1326 (citing a second letter from EPA that stated "'we remain
concerned that the approach used to develop the EIS has inappropriately eliminated reasonable
alternatives, in both the United States ... and Canada, that could meet the stated purpose and need for
the project"' and "'[w]e do not believe that the EIS has provided sufficient or compelling reasons for the
elimination of alternatives presented"' (quoting 8/22/02 Letter from EPA to FERC, R. Vol. IV)).
259. See id. at 1326 ("FERC clearly considered and responded to EPA's comments on the
[draft] EIS . . . .").
260. Id. ("EPA does not challenge the need for the proposed pipeline, but prefers that this need
be met by expanding an existing system.").
261. Id. at 1327.
262. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 564 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2009); see
id. at 552, 554 (explaining that the proposed closure and new construction were required to comply with
new FAA safety standards for runways, and that "[w]hile the FAA found that a new airport at the
[proposed] [s]ite would have a significant adverse effect on natural resources, it nevertheless approved
the project because it found that no prudent alternative existed").
263. Id. at 556 (noting that the environmental groups alleged the EIS failed to adequately
evaluate project alternatives, "consider the indirect and cumulative effects," and "disclose scientific
evidence" that the mitigation efforts are unlikely to be effective).
264. Id. at 560 ("Although, as [EPA] pointed out, the FAA might have improved its FEIS by
including a 'complete watershed build-out analysis . . . for the West Bay alternatives,"' the FAA's
"discussion of runoff impacts on the West Bay watershed [wa]s not so lacking in detail that it fail[ed] to
comply with NEPA's procedural requirements").
265. See, e.g., id. ('Even if the [EIS could have been improved by analyzing induced impacts
separately from cumulative impacts, [citing EPA comment letter supporting as much], NEPA does not
require separate analyses.").
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been due to a history of Second Circuit deference to lead agency analysis. 266
Equally plausible, however, is that the court failed to analyze the adverse
comments because the environmental groups never alleged that the FAA's
failure to respond to the agency comments violated NEPA.2 67
One case that appears to be an outlier is the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Arkansas Wildlife Federationv. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in which the

court deferred to the lead agency's determination as to which agency
comments warranted a response.268 The Army Corps prepared an EIS on a
proposed plan to conserve water in the Alluvial and Sparta Aquifers in
Mississippi and Arkansas. 269 Environmentalists alleged that the EIS violated
NEPA by failing to adequately consider the cumulative impacts of a proposed
large irrigation system that the Corps claimed would increase efficiency and
thereby conserve water. 270 The environmentalists pointed to comments from
the EPA, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and other government agencies that
criticized the Corps's cumulative impact analysis because it failed to consider
the results of ongoing comprehensive studies by other agencies in the same
region as the Alluvial and Sparta Aquifers.2 71' The Eighth Circuit dismissed
the comments and instead relied on the Corps's judgment.272 The court
decided that NEPA "only requires that the Corps consider and respond to the
comments of other agencies" but "does not require the Corps to wait for other
agencies to complete their studies .. . or to accept the input or suggestions of
other agencies. 273 Thus, the Eighth Circuit upheld the Corps's EIS. 274
266. See, e.g., id. ("NEPA 'requires agencies preparing [EISs] to consider and respond to
comments of other agencies, not to agree with them."' (citing Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256
F.3d 1024, 1038 (10th Cir. 2001)); id. ('[The FAA, not the EPA, bore the ultimate statutory
responsibility for actually preparing the [EIS], and under the rule of reason, a lead agency does not have
to follow the EPA's comments slavishly-it just has to take them seriously." (quoting Citizens Against
Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190,201 (D.C. Cir. 1991))).
267. See, e.g., Petitioners' Reply Brief at 20-21, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 564 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. June 18, 2007) (No. 06-5267-ag), 2007 WL 6926588 (highlighting
comments from EPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service as evidence that FAA's alternatives analysis was
inadequate, but never actually arguing that the FAA failed to address or discuss those agency comments).
268. Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 431 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005).
269. Id. at 1099.
270. Id. (describing the "Grand Prairie Project" as a plan "to allow continued irrigation of the
agricultural region while preserving the Alluvial Aquifer" by "increasing agricultural efficiency of water
usage," reducing "water withdrawals," adding "farm reservoirs," constructing "a system that would
pump excess water from the White River into the Grand Prairie region," and "various environmental
improvement[s]").
271. Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 431 F.3d at 1101 (observing that "other government agencies urged
the Corps to wait for the completion of comprehensive studies" of the river basin).
272. Id. ("It is up to the Corps to decide which comments of other agencies are of value to its
projects, and [the court is] hesitant to second guess its judgment.") (internal citations omitted).
273. Id. (citing Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1068 (8th Cir. 1977); Custer
Cnty. Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1038 (10th Cir. 2001)).
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The results of these cases seem inconsistent with our thesis because
although agency comments criticized the lead agency's analysis, the
reviewing courts did not find NEPA violations. In some cases, such as
2 76 the
Wetlands Action Networle" and Greater Yellowstone Coalition,
courts determined that the adverse agency comments did not actually
challenge the lead agency's analysis. In other decisions, where the adverse
comments did directly challenge the lead agency's analysis or conclusions,
such as Akiak Native Community277 and Custer County,278 so long as the
lead agency addressed the commenting agency's concerns, the court
rejected the NEPA challenge. Thus, assuming an adverse agency comment
directly challenges the lead agency's analysis, these decisions support the
notion that agency comments warrant close attention from the lead agency.
Where the lead agency seriously considers adverse agency comments, some
courts impose less exacting judicial review.
CONCLUSION

This review of recent NEPA cases largely reaffirms the 1990 study's
conclusion that courts are sensitive to comments from expert agencies in
reviewing NEPA implementation. At both the threshold stage and the EIS
stage, the case law discussed in this article illustrates the influence of
adverse agency comments on judicial review of NEPA challenges.
Sometimes adverse comments serve as the basis for the finding of NEPA
violations by focusing the reviewing court's attention on particular
inadequacies in a lead agency's analysis; sometimes they induce the lead
agency to revise its analysis or alter its proposal. In either case, the practical
effect is that adverse agency comments usually trigger heightened scrutiny
of proposals through the NEPA process. Whether the reviewing court or the
lead agency conducts the review, the fact that adverse agency comments
elicit greater scrutiny is consistent with congressional intent.27 9
Comments from agencies and the corresponding heightened judicial
scrutiny are thus a powerful yet undervalued vehicle that both commenting
agencies and litigants may use to achieve NEPA's goal of improved
environmental protection through informed decisionmaking. In order to
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 225-32, 234 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (mandating that lead agencies "shall consult with
and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact").

2012]

45

Pluralismand the Environment Revisited

continue to fulfill this goal, agencies must devote resources to commenting
in an era of budget shortfalls.2 80 The EPA2 " and federal fish and wildlife
agencies, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, have a special role in making NEPA work
effectively. 282 Moreover, states-which often claim to be ignored by federal
agencies 28 3-should see that their own agencies could gain significant
influence through the NEPA commenting process. 28 Tribal governments
should see the same opportunity, as evidenced by the comments submitted
in the Northern Cheyenne case.285

Litigants also need to understand the potentially crucial role adverse
agency comments play in NEPA lawsuits.286 Environmental groups should
encourage federal, state, and tribal agencies to comment throughout the
NEPA process because those comments may later prove decisive in ensuing
NEPA litigation. Failure to employ agency comments strategically may help
explain some of the case law that seems inconsistent with our thesis that
adverse agency comments can be crucial to the results of NEPA litigation.
Potential NEPA plaintiffs need to be alert to the possibilities that adverse
agency comments can provide. But in order to do so, they must play a
proactive role throughout the NEPA process-and long before they file suit.
If interested parties opt to participate in the NEPA process, they can
encourage critical agency comments and help to fulfill NEPA's goal of
making environmental analysis more precise, thereby improving
environmental decisionmaking. Interagency pluralism remains a largely
undervalued and under-used but extremely powerful means for both litigants
and commenting agencies to affect the NEPA process.

280.

See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Paul Verkul and Pragmatic Adjushnent in Govenment, 32

CARDOZO L REV. 2459, 2479 (2011) (noting that "EPA has been particularly challenged" because "it has
roughly the same budget in constant dollars that it had in 1984," yet since that time "Congress has passed
ambitious amendments to every major environmental law, giving the agency considerably more work to do").
281. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
283. NEPA TASK FORCE, THE NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 28 (Sept. 2003) ("Several State

agencies commented that State expertise is sometimes ignored by Federal lead agencies, and that State
data and information were not adequately used in the NEPA analysis.").
284. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(2Xi) (directing lead agencies to "[riequest the comments of...
[a]pproprite State and local agencies which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards").
285.

See supra notes 142-45, 147-49 and accompanying text; 40 C.F.R.

§

1503.1(a)(2Xii)

(directing lead agencies to "[r]equest the comments of... Indian tribes, when the effects may be on a
reservation").
286. Conpare Mid States Coal. fbr Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., supm notes 195-99 and
accompanying text, with Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't ofNavy, supra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.

